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Climate change is likely to have relevant effects on our future socio-economic systems. It is therefore 
important to identify how markets and policy jointly react to expected climate change to protect our 
societies and well-being. This study addresses this issue by carrying out an integrated analysis of both 
optimal mitigation and adaptation at the global and regional level. Adaptation responses are disentangled 
into three different modes: reactive adaptation, proactive (or anticipatory) adaptation, and investments in 
innovation for adaptation purposes. The size, the timing, the relative contribution to total climate-related 
damage reduction, and the benefit-cost ratios of each of these strategies are assessed for the world as a 
whole, and for developed and developing countries in both a cooperative and a non-cooperative setting.  
The study also takes into account the role of price signals and markets in inducing and diffusing 
adaptation. This leads to two scenarios: A pessimistic one, in which policy-driven adaptation bears the 
burden, together with mitigation, of reducing climate damage; and an optimistic one, in which markets 
also autonomously contribute to reducing some damages by modifying sectoral structure, international 
trade flows, capital distribution and land allocation.  For all scenarios, the costs and benefits of adaptation 
are assessed using WITCH, an integrated assessment, intertemporal optimization, forward-looking 
model. Extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the size of climate damages and of the discount rate 
has also been carried out. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Adaptation has become a strategic negotiation issue only recently, although UNFCCC (1992) 
already referred to it in Art. 2 and Art. 4. Among other things, the difficulty of implementing 
national and international mitigation policies and the increasing awareness of climate inertia 
eventually put adaptation under the spotlight of science and policy. The EU has recently released 
the “Green Paper on Adaptation” (see EU, 2007) and many EU countries have prepared and started 
to implement national adaptation plans. The Bali action plan (2008) has identified the need for 
enhanced adaptation action by Parties of the Convention, and adaptation is among the five key 
building blocks for a strengthened response to climate change. COP 13 has established the 
Adaptation Fund Board with the role of managing the Adaptation Fund, established at COP7. 
COP14 at Poznan (2009) also made some progress on a number of important issues concerning 
adaptation.  
 
Indeed, the ultimate question policy makers are interested in is how to reduce the climate-change 
vulnerability of socio-economic systems in the most cost-effective way. This can be done both 
through mitigation and adaptation. But this requires on the one hand a thorough knowledge of the 
size and the regional distribution of damages, and on the other hand a precise assessment of the 
cost/effectiveness of alternative policies and of their strategic complementarity or trade-off. 
 
An extended literature has investigated the different dimensions of mitigation strategies, whereas 
much less can be found on adaptation. Even less on the interactions between adaptation and 
mitigation. The recent increasing emphasis on adaptation thus raises a set of still unanswered 
questions concerning the design of an optimal mix of mitigation and adaptation measures. And the 
cost-benefit ratio of different adaptation/mitigation options. New relevant insights need to be 
provided on the optimal resource allocation between mitigation and adaptation. Or on the optimal 
timing of mitigation and adaptation measures. Or on the marginal contribution to reducing 
vulnerability of market and policy driven adaptation strategies. 
 
This study addresses these and other issues using AD-WITCH, an Integrated Assessment Model 
(IAM) that has been developed for the joint analysis of adaptation and mitigation. Compared to the 
few existing studies in the field, the proposed modeling framework provides a more detailed 
characterization of the adaptation process, which is disentangled into three components: 
anticipatory, reactive and innovative adaptation. In addition, it provides an updated quantitative 
support for the calibration of adaptation costs and benefits. Therefore, in this study, we will be able 
to: 
•  Analyse adaptation to climate change both in isolation and jointly with mitigation strategies 
•  Provide a comparative cost-benefit analysis of both adaptation and mitigation 
•  Assess the marginal contribution to the benefit-cost ratio of different adaptation modes. 
 
We will start with a cost-benefit analysis of macro-policy driven responses to climate change, 
namely, adaptation, mitigation, and then adaptation and mitigation implemented jointly. By 
narrowing down the focus on policy-driven adaptation, we will then compute the benefit-cost 
ratios of three macro adaptation strategies (reactive, anticipatory or proactive and knowledge 
adaptation).We will also assess how market-driven adaptation reduces the vulnerability of economic 
systems to climate change. Finally, we will re-compute the benefit-cost ratios for different policy-
driven adaptation strategies net of market-drive autonomous adaptation to climate change. 
 
AD-WITCH, the model used to carry out most of the analysis, is an optimal growth Integrated 
Assessment model endowed with an adaptation module to compute the costs and benefits of policy-  2
driven mitigation and adaptation strategies. Given the game-theoretic and regional structure of AD-
WITCH (see the Appendix), both first best and second best climate policies can be computed. In 
this study, we focus on a first best world in which all externalities are internalized by the adopted 
policy. The social planner implements the optimal levels of adaptation and mitigation, i.e. the level 
that equalizes marginal costs and benefits across world regions and time periods. 
 
At the same time, this study emphasises that adaptation is also driven by changes in relative prices, 
which lead to what can be defined as market-driven adaptation. Market-driven adaptation may 
affect the size and the regional distribution of climate change damages. As a consequence, policy-
driven adaptation should be planned on the basis of the climate change damages net of market 
adjustments.  
 
To account for both market-driven and policy-driven adaptation, two different modeling tools have 
been used. The ICES model, which is a highly disaggregated computable general equilibrium 
model, has been used to identify the effects of market–driven adaptation. ICES and AD-WITCH 
have then been integrated to provide a full assessment of both market- and policy-driven adaptation. 
More precisely, the effects of market-driven adaptation on regional climate damages have been 
estimated using the ICES model. These estimates have been used to modify WITCH’s climate 
change damage functions to compute climate damages net of market-driven adaptation.  
 
The final part of this study describes specific adaptation proposals. These are consistent with the 
analysis carried out in the first part of the study, and build upon existing estimates of costs and 
benefits of specific adaptation strategies.   
2. Background concepts 
In this study, climate change is defined as a set of alterations in the average weather caused by 
global warming, which is due to emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Climate change affects not 
only average surface temperature, but it also involves other physical modifications, such as changes 
in precipitations, intensity and frequency of storms, and the occurrence of droughts and floods.  
Average temperature is already 0.7 degree above preindustrial level and further warming might be 
substantial if no immediate global action is undertaken. Even if all radiative forcing agents were 
held constant at the 2000 level, a further warming would be observed due to the inertia of oceans 
(IPCC, 2007). According to the main IPCC scenarios, world-average temperature is likely to 
increase in the business as usual scenarios as shown in Figure 1, which also shows our projections. 
Projected global temperature changes above preindustrial levels range between +2.8 and +4 °C . 
Anthropogenic climate change, accelerating the natural trend, will induce a series of impacts on 
natural and social ecosystems with potentially both negative and positive consequences on human 
well being. As highlighted in the IPCC AR4 (2007), already a moderate warming produces negative 
consequences: increasing number of people exposed to water stresses, extinction of species and 
ecosystems, decrease in cereal productivity at low latitudes, land loss due to sea level rise in coastal 
areas, increase in mortality and morbidity associated to change in the incidence of vector borne 
diseases or to increased frequency and intensity of heath waves; infrastructural disruption and 
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Figure 1: Temperature  estimates of the IPCC SRES
1 (IIASA) , the WITCH model (Bosetti 



























































Source: Our elaboration. 
 
A first classification of climate change impacts distinguished between market and non-market 
impacts. Market effects can be valued using prices and observed changes in demand and supply, 
whereas non-market effects have no observable prices and therefore require other methods such as 
valuations based on willingness to pay.  
 
The recent literature points to the large potential damages from climate change, especially on 
developing countries and on non-market sectors (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007). In particular, important 
non-market impacts are those on health. Current estimates are largely incomplete and most 
assessments have looked at specific diseases (vector-born diseases, cardiovascular and respiratory 
diseases). Moreover, indirect economic implications may be relevant. Nonetheless, for the US only,  
Hanemman (2008) estimates large impacts on health, reporting a loss of 1990 $US10 billion per 
year against the $US 2 billion reported in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).  
 
Climate change can lead to a significant rise in sea level and catastrophic events with implications 
on migrations and stock of capital. Insurance companies are an important source of information 
regarding estimates of capital losses due to climate change impacts. UNFCCC (2007) reports a cost 
of protecting infrastructure from climate change in North America between 1990 $US4 and 64 
billion already in 2030, when temperature increase is likely to be far below 2.5°C.  
 
The Munich Re insurance company developed a database which catalogues great natural 
catastrophes that had severe impacts on the economic system. Such a database underestimates 
damages from climate, because only large events are included. Yet estimated losses are in the order 
of 0.5% of current world GDP, and damages are increasing at a rate of 6% a year in real terms. 
Using this information and adjusting for the under-reporting of other minor impacts, UNFCCC 
(2007) extrapolated a cost between 1 and 1.5% of world GDP in 2030, which corresponds to 1990 
$US850-1 350 billion. Nordhaus and Boyer reported similar figures for total impacts, and for a 
temperature increase of 2.5°C, which is likely to occur at least several decades after 2030.  
 
For a temperature increase above 2.5°C, the majority of Impact Assessment (IA) models currently 
used to evaluate the full cost of climate change, forecast net losses from climatic changes ranging 
roughly from a tiny percent to 2% of world GDP (Figure 2).   
 
 
                                                 
1 Available at: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/GGI/DB/   4





Source: Our adaptation from IPCC AR4 (2007) 
 
Table 1: Regional climate change impacts as % of GDP corresponding to a temperature increase of +2.5°C 




(Bosello et al. 
2009)* 
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Mendelsohn et al. 
(2000) 
Pierce et al. 
(1996) 
USA 0.2  0.4  1.3  1.5  0.4 -0.3  1 
WEURO -1.3  1.6  1.4  1.6  2.8  n.a.  1.4 
EEURO 0.8  0.5  n.a.  0  0.7  n.a.  -0.3 
KOSAU 0.9  0.8  n.a.  0  -0.4  n.a.  1.4 
CAJANZ -0.8  0.5  n.a.  3.8  0.5  0.1  1.4 
TE 0.9  0.8  0.4  -0.4  -0.7  -11  0.7 
MENA 0.2  2.9  n.a.  5.5  1.9  n.a.  4.1 
SSA 2.0  5.1  n.a.  6.9  3.9  n.a. 8.7 
SASIA 3.0  5.5  n.a.  0  4.9  2  n.a. 
CHINA 1.7  0.5  2.9  -0.1  0.2  -1.8  5 
EASIA 2.3  4.2  n.a.  5.3  1.8  n.a.  8.6 
LACA 1.8  2.3  n.a. 3.1  2.4  1.4  4.3 
Source: our adaptation from the quoted studies 
* This study includes market driven adaptation 
** This study includes only policy driven adaptation 
 
 
Climate change is not uniform over the world though, moreover impacts are diverse and highly 
differentiated by regions. Regions themselves differ for their intrinsic adaptive capacity. These 
dimensions, i.e. exposure, sensitivity and autonomous adaptive capacity determine a highly 
differentiated regional vulnerability to climate change. Accordingly, the global picture can provide 
only a very partial and potentially misleading insight on the true economic cost of climate change. 
Aggregation can indeed conceal vulnerability and climate change costs “hot spots” as depicted in   5
Table 1. As a general rule, developing countries would be more affected than their developed 
counterparts. 
Notwithstanding the differences in results, - driven by different model specifications, modelling 
approaches and underlying assumptions - the inspection of Table 1 highlights the following robust 
messages: 
•  Even an almost null aggregate loss potentially experienced by the world as a whole, and 
associated to a moderate climatic change, entails high costs for some regions. It is even 
more so in the case of moderate to high aggregate economic losses. 
•  There is a clear “equity-adverse” effect from the distribution of climate change impacts: 
higher costs are experienced by developing regions which are already facing serious 
challenges to their social economic development; moreover, within a country or region, 
climate change adverse effects hit more severely weaker social groups which are both more 
exposed and less able to adapt. 
What is true at the world level applies at the regional level as well. Even a net gain for a region 
compounds both positive and negative effects. Some of these negative effects can be particularly 
concerning also for a developed region. Think for instance to an increase in mortality due to more 
frequent and intense heath waves, hitting aged population; loss of coastal areas due to sea-level rise; 
increase in hydro-geological risk due to an increase in frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
events.  Table 2 summarizes the damage estimates for a 2.5°C increase in global temperature above 
its 1900 level, both for the whole economy (Total) and broken down by sectors, as estimated in 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).  
 
Table 2. Climate change impacts in different world regions under a 2.5°C increase in global 
temperature above its 1900 level  
Region TOTAL  Agriculture  Other 
vulnerable 
market 




United States  0.45  0.06  0  0.11  0.02  -0.28  0.44  0.1 
China 0.22  -0.37  0.13  0.07  0.09  -0.26  0.52  0.05 
Japan 0.5  -0.46  0  0.56  0.02  -0.31  0.45  0.25 
EU 2.83  0.49  0  0.6  0.02  -0.43  1.91  0.25 
Russia -0.65  -0.69  -0.37  0.09  0.02  -0.75  0.99  0.05 
India 4.93  1.08  0.4  0.09  0.69  0.3  2.27  0.1 
Other high income  -0.39  -0.95  -0.31  0.16  0.02  -0.35  0.94  0.1 
High-income OPEC  1.95  0  0.91  0.06  0.23  0.24  0.46  0.05 
Eastern Europe  0.71  0.46  0  0.01  0.02  -0.36  0.47  0.1 
Middle-income 2.44  1.13  0.41  0.04  0.32  -0.04  0.47  0.1 
Lower middle-
income 
1.81 0.04 0.29  0.09  0.32  -0.04  1.01  0.1 
Africa 3.91  0.05  0.09  0.02  3  0.25  0.39  0.1 
Low-income 2.64  0.04  0.46  0.09  0.66  0.2  1.09  0.1 
                
Global              
Output-weighted 1.5  0.13  0.05  0.32  0.1  -0.29  0.17  1.02 
Population-weighted 2.19  0.17  0.23  0.12  0.56  -0.03  0.1  1.05 
   
Source: Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 
 
Among rich countries, Europe is estimated to suffer most from climate change, because of the 
assumption of high vulnerability to catastrophic events. Among developing regions, Africa and   6
India face larger climate impacts due to impacts on health and catastrophic events, respectively. 
Impacts on agriculture vary a lot with the climatic conditions of the regions and become positive for 
cold or mild regions (e.g. Russia, China). Similar pattern can be identified for impacts on energy 
use, with cold regions being more positively affected (Russia). 
Current climate change policies - under discussion within the EU (Cf. COM (2005); COM (2007)) - 
aim at setting a “prudential” 2°C threshold to temperature increase above preindustrial level within 
the century. The aim is to (Cf. COM (2007) page 2) “limit
2 the impacts of climate change and the 
likelihood of massive and irreversible disruptions of the global ecosystem”. Thus, even assuming a 
successful accomplishment, the world will be anyway exposed to a certain degree of climate change 
and to its negative consequences for the century to come. Moreover, the stated target is considered 
particularly ambitious: it requires aggressive mitigation actions from developed regions, coupled 
with an extended international participation involving a still-to-reach explicit commitment to 
binding emission reduction from major polluters among developing countries. Accordingly, it is 
very likely that the world will face a higher temperature increase and more damaging consequences 
than those expected from a 2°C warming. 
In the light of this, as stressed by the “EU White Paper on Adaptation” (2009), mitigation needs to 
be necessarily coupled with adaptation actions. These, be they anticipatory or reactive, represent the 
only viable option to cope with unavoidable climate change impacts that mitigation cannot 
eliminate.       
 
3. Defining adaptation: a multidimensional concept  
Adaptation to climate change received a wide set of definitions, by the scientific and the policy 
environments (among the first group, see e.g.: Burton (1992), Smit (1993), Smithers and Smit 
(1997), Smit et al. (2000) among the second group, see e.g.: UNDP (2005), EEA (2005), UNFCCC 
(2006)). The large number of not always coincident definitions already highlights a specific 
problem concerning adaptation: it is a process that can take the most diverse forms depending on 
where and when it occurs and on who is adapting to what. 
Indeed, probably the most comprehensive, known and widely accepted definition of adaptation is 
the one provided by the 2001, IPCC AR3 which states “[adaptation is any] adjustment in 
ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli, and their 
effects or impacts. This term refers to changes in processes, practices or structures to moderate or 
offset potential damages or to take advantages of opportunities associated with changes in climate” 
(IPCC TAR, 2001) which is general enough to encompass the widest spectrum of options. 
Adaptation can be identified along three dimensions:  
-  the subject of adaptation (who or what adapts) 
-  the object of adaptation (what they adapt to) 
-  the way in which adaptation takes place (how they adapt).  
This last dimension includes what resources are used, when and how they are used and with which 
results (Wheaton and Maciver, 1999). 
The subject of adaptation: Who or what adapts. Adaptation materialises in changes in ecological, 
social and/or economic systems. These changes can be the result of natural responses and in this 
case they usually involve organisms or species, or of socio-economic or institutional reactions in 
which case they are undertaken by individual or collective actors, private or public agents.  
                                                 
2 Italics is ours.   7
The object of adaptation: What they adapt to. In the case of climate change, adaptive responses can 
be induced either by changes in average conditions or by changes in variability of extreme events. 
While in the first case the change is slow and usually falls within the “coping range” of systems, in 
the second case changes are abrupt and outside this coping range (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001). 
How adaptation occurs: Modes, resources and results. The existing literature (see e.g. Smit et al. 
1999; Klein and Tol, 1997; Fankhauser et al., 1999; IPCC, 2001) proposes several criteria that can 
be used to identify the different adaptation processes. Table 3 offers a tentative summary of this 
classification based upon spatial and temporal aspects, forms and evaluation of performances. 
 
Table 3.  Adaptation: Possible criteria for classification 
Concept or Attribute   
Purposefulness  Autonomous → Planned 
Timing  Anticipatory → Reactive, Responsive 
Temporal Scope  Short term → Long term 
Spatial Scope  Localised → Widespread 
Function/Effects  Retreat – accommodate – protect – prevent 
Form  Structural – legal – institutional 
Valuation of 
Performance  Effectiveness-efficiency-equity-feasibility 
Source: Our adaptation from Smit et al. 1999 
 
This study focuses on a different way of classifying adaptation to climate change, by distinguishing 
between autonomous or “market-driven” and planned or “policy-driven” adaptation. Inside policy 
driven adaptation, we will distinguish between anticipatory or proactive and responsive or reactive 
adaptation.  
The IPCC (IPCC TAR, 2001) defines autonomous adaptation as: “adaptation that does not 
constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in natural 
systems and by market or welfare changes in human systems” and planned adaptation as: 
“adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy decision based on an awareness that conditions 
have changed or are about to change and that action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve 
a desired state” 
This apparently clear distinction, may originate some confusion when adaptation involves socio-
economic agents. Indeed, climate change may induce market or welfare effect triggering reactions 
in private agents without the necessity of a planned strategy designed by a public agency, but “just” 
as a response to scarcity signals provided by changes in relative prices. A typical example of this is 
the effect of climate change on crops’ productivity. This has both physical effects (changing yields) 
and economic effects (changing agricultural goods’ prices) that can induce farmers to some 
adaptation (for example changes in the cultivation type or timing). This form of private socio-
economic adaptation even though responding to a plan and originated by (rational) economic 
decisions is considered autonomous or “market driven” (see e.g. Leary 1999, Smith et a. 1996). On 
the contrary, the term planned adaptation is reserved to public interventions by governments or 
agencies
3.  
                                                 
3 The IPCC (IPCC TAR, 2001) provides also the definition of private adaptation: “adaptation that is initiated and 
implemented by individuals, households or private companies. Private adaptation is usually in the actors’ rational self 
interest” and of public adaptation that is: “adaptation that is initiated and implemented by governments at all levels. 
Public adaptation is usually directed at collective needs”.   8
Another important distinction is the one based on the timing of adaptation actions which 
distinguishes between anticipatory or proactive adaptation and reactive or responsive adaptation. 
They are defined by the IPCC (IPCC, TAR, 2001) as: “adaptation that takes place before and after 
impacts of climate change are observed”, respectively. There can be circumstances when an 
anticipatory intervention is less costly and more effective than a reactive action (typical example is 
that of flood or coastal protection), and this is particularly relevant for planned adaptation. Reactive 
adaptation is a major characteristic of unmanaged natural system and of autonomous adaptation 
reactions of social economic systems. 
The temporal scope defines long-term and short- term adaptation. This distinction can also be 
referred to tactical opposed to strategic, or to instantaneous versus cumulative (Smit et al., 1999). In 
the natural hazards field it is adjustment versus adaptation (Smit et al. 2000) 
For the sake of completeness, let us mention other classifications of adaptation. Based on spatial 
scope, adaptation can be localized or widespread, even though it is noted that adaptation has an 
intrinsic local nature (Fussel and Klein, 2006). Several attributes can also characterize the effects of 
adaptation. According to Smit et al. 1999 they can be: accommodate, retreat, protect, prevent, 
tolerate etc. Based on the form adaptations can take they can be distinguished according to whether 
they are primarily technological, behavioural, financial, institutional, or informational. 
Finally the performance of adaptation processes can be evaluated according to the generic 
principles of policy appraisal: cost-efficiency
4, cost-effectiveness, administrative feasibility and 
equity. As noted by Adger (2005), in such appraisal effectiveness has to be considered latu-sensu. 
Indeed, it is important to account for spatial and temporal “spillovers” of adaptation measures. 
Basically, a locally effective adaptation policy may negatively affect neighbouring regions, and a 
temporary successful adaptation policy can weaken vulnerability in the longer term, both constitute 
examples of maladaptation. By the same token efficiency, effectiveness, equity are not “absolute”, 
but context specific, varying between countries, sectors within countries, actors engaged in 
adaptation processes. 
 
4. Mitigation and adaptation as a single integrated policy process 
Adaptation and mitigation are both viable strategies to combat damages due to climate change. 
However they tackle the problem from completely different angles.  
Mitigation and adaptation work at different spatial and time scales. Mitigation is “global” and “long 
term” while adaptation is “local” and “shorter term” (Klein et al., 2003; Fussel and Klein, 2006; 
Tol, 2005; Wilbanks, 2005, Ingham et al. 2005a). This has several important implications. 
Firstly, mitigation can be considered as a “permanent” solution to anthropogenic climate change. 
Indeed, once abated, one ton of say CO2, cannot produce damage anymore (unless its removal is 
temporary like in the case of carbon capture and sequestration provided by forests or agricultural 
land). In contrast, adaptation is more temporary as it typically addresses current or expected 
damages. It thus may require adjustments should the damage change or be substantially different 
from what was originally expected. 
Secondly, the effects of mitigation and adaptation occur at different times (Wilbanks, 2005; Klein et 
al., 2003; Fussel and Klein, 2006). Mitigation is constrained by “long-term climatic inertia”, while 
adaptation by a “shorter-term, social-economic inertia”. In other words, emission reductions today 
will translate in a lower temperature increase and ultimately lower damage only in the (far) future, 
                                                 
4 The concept of cost efficiency implies that resources are used in the best possible way, cost effectiveness that 
resources to reach a given target - that can be sub-optimal - are used in the best possible way. The practical 
implementation of both concepts requires that actions respond to some kind of cost benefit criterion.   9
whereas adaptation measures, once implemented, are immediately effective in reducing the 
damage
5. This differentiation is particularly relevant under the policy making perspective: probably,  
the stronger reason for the scarce appeal of mitigation policies  is their “certain” and “present” cost 
facing a future and thus uncertain benefit
6. This can be less of an issue for adaptation. Moreover the 
different intertemporal characteristics tend to expose mitigation more than adaptation to subjective 
assumptions in policy decision making, like the choice of the discount rates. It can be expected that 
a lower discount rate, putting more weight on future damages, can increases the appeal of 
mitigation with respect to adaptation.  
Thirdly, mitigation provides a “global”, whereas adaptation provides a “local” response to 
anthropogenic climate change. The benefits induced by a ton of carbon abated are experienced 
irrespectively of where this ton has been abated. Differently, adaptation entails measures 
implemented locally whose benefits advantage primarily the local communities targeted. The global 
public good nature of emissions reduction creates the well known incentive to free ride. This is one 
of the biggest problems in reaching a large and sustainable international mitigation agreement (on 
the vast related literature on this see e.g.: Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998, Bosetti et al. 2009a); again 
this should be less of a problem in the case of adaptation policies.  
It is worth mentioning that mitigation involves decision making at the highest level, i.e. national 
governments, is implemented at the country level (Tol, 2005), and concerns “large”, highly 
concentrated sectors (like e.g. energy and energy intensive industries (Klein et al., 2003)). 
Adaptation needs to be implemented at an atomistic level involving a much larger number of 
stakeholders. Thus, at least in principle, the design of an international policy effort could be easier - 
and the related coordination and transaction costs lower - for mitigation, than for adaptation.  
In addition, in the absence of international coordination, substantial unilateral mitigation actions are 
unlikely to occur. Here the concern is double: on the one hand, the environmental effectiveness of 
unilateral action is likely to be small; on the other hand, national goods and services of the abating 
country can loose competitiveness in international markets if their prices “incorporate” the cost of 
the tighter emission standards. This is not necessarily so with adaptation: its smaller scale and the 
excludability of its benefits can spur also a unilateral effort. 
The different spatial effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation is also relevant in the light of 
“spatial uncertainty” of climate change damages (Lecoq and Shalizi, 2007). Not knowing exactly 
where and with which intensity negative climatic impacts are going to hit, policy decision should 
bias toward mitigation which is “globally effective”; on the contrary adaptation should be used to 
deal with  reasonably well understood local phenomena.    
Finally there is an equity dimension. Abatement intrinsically endorses the “polluter-pays” principle. 
Each one abates her own emissions (directly or indirectly if “where” flexibility is allowed)
7. This is 
not necessarily the case with adaptation: it can well alleviate damages which are not directly 
provoked by the affected community. This is particularly important for international, especially 
North/South, climate negotiations. Indeed adaptation is particularly needed in developing countries 
which are either more exposed or vulnerable (higher sensitivity, lower capacity to adapt) to climate 
change (IPCC, 1996; IPCC, 2001, IPCC 2007), while historically they contributed relatively less to 
the problem. Adaptation in developing countries thus calls objectively for strong international 
support. 
                                                 
5 It has to be stressed that economic inertias can be long as well e.g. implementing coastal protection interventions can 
take many years (or even decades) and that adaptation may not be immediately effective as it is the case for anticipatory 
adaptation. 
6 Fussel and Klein, (2006) note that monitoring mitigation effectiveness is easier than monitoring adaptation. They refer 
to the fact that it is easier to measure emission reduction than quantify the avoided climate change damage due to 
adaptation. They do not refer to the quantification of the avoided future damage due to emission reduction. 
7 Again this is not necessarily so in the case of sequestration activities.   10
For what said - and following a widely accepted efficiency and common wisdom principle 
according to which a wider portfolio of options should be preferred to a narrower one - it seems 
reasonable to integrate mitigation and adaptation in the design of a more cost-effective policy to 
combat climate change (Ingham et al., 2005a; Kane and Yohe, 2000; Parry, 2001). This is 
particularly true in the light of the overall uncertainty that still surrounds our understanding of 
climatic, environmental, social-economic processes, which ultimately determines the uncertainty in 
the assessment of the costs and benefits of climate change policy. In an uncertain framework, a 
precautionary policy would avoid both the extremes of total inaction and of drastic immediate 
mitigation. The optimal strategy would be a combination of mitigation and adaptation measures 
(Kane and Shogren 2000; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2004). In other words, decision maker needs to 
place herself somewhere inside the  decision space represented by the triangle of Figure 3: vertex 
are possible, but unlikely. 
How mitigation and adaptation should be combined? This intuitively depends on their degree of 
substitutability or complementarity.  Kane and Shogren (2000) analyse this issue in the context of 
the economic theory of endogenous risk. They demonstrate that when adaptation and mitigation 
both reduce the risk of adverse effects of climate change, they are both used by agents until 
expected marginal benefits and costs are equated across strategies. Corner solutions (adaptation or 
mitigation only outcomes) are also discussed as theoretical possibilities, if for instance an 
international mitigation agreement failed to be signed, making agents aware of the practical 
ineffectiveness of (unilateral) mitigation action or if, conversely, the climate regime is so strict to 
eliminate the necessity to adapt to any climate change damage.  The analysis of agents’ response to 
increased climate change risk is more complex. It depends on two effects: a direct effect of risk on 
the marginal productivity of a strategy and an indirect effect of risk which is determined by risk 
impacts on the other strategy and by the relationship between the two strategies. The indirect effect 
amplifies (dampens) the direct effect if the marginal productivity of one strategy increases 
(decreases) and the two strategies are complement (substitutes) or if marginal productivity 
decreases (increases) and the strategies are substitutes (complements). Kane and Shogren (2000) 
suggest that the actual relationship between adaptation and mitigation strategies is an empirical 
matter.     
 
Figure 3. Mitigation adaptation and impacts: a schematic “decision space” 
 
 
Source: IPCC AR4 (2007) 
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Figure 4: Technical change and optimal abatement in the presence of adaptation and mitigation 
   
 
Source: Our elaboration. 
 
Figure 4 provides a neat representation of the trade-off between mitigation and adaptation, taking 
into account the potential effects of technical change. The role of technical change as a key element 
to reduce abatement costs and therefore to encourage cheaper abatement effort has long been 
studied in the climate-economy literature (e.g. Bosetti et al. 2009). However, such analyses have 
neglected potential interactions that may arise in the presence of adaptation responses. Technical 
change as conceived by most Integrated Assessment models featuring endogenous technical change 
would reduce marginal abatement cost from MC to MC’ (see Figure 4). In the absence of any 
adaptation effort, abatement would increase to a’’. However, adaptation affects the optimal level of 
mitigation and thus of abatement, because it increases the damage that can be tolerated, thus 
reducing the marginal benefit from abatement. Should adaptation shift the marginal benefit curve 
downward (from MB to MB’), then final abatement could be even lower than the initial level a (see 
the right-hand side panel of Figure 4 where the final equilibrium a’ is smaller than a). 
Therefore, it is crucial to assess the exact nature of the relationship between mitigation and 
adaptation. However, the literature on this topic, either the one focussing on the general 
characteristics of mitigation and adaptation or the one proposing specific case studies, does not 
seem to converge on a consistent characterisation of the trade-off between the two. 
According to Klein et al., (2003) complementarity can be invoked as important synergies can be 
created between the two strategies when measures that control greenhouse gas concentration also 
reduce adverse effects of climate change or vice versa. In addition, there is the possibility that many 
adaptation measures implemented specifically in developing countries may also promote the 
sustainability of their development (see e.g.; Huq et al., 2003, Dang et al., 2003).  
Parry et al. (2001) highlight that mitigation delaying climate change impacts can “buy more time” 
to reduce vulnerability through adaptation (the converse is more controversial, see Klein et al., 
(2007)). Symmetrically, adaptation can rise thresholds which need to be avoided by mitigation 
(Yohe and Strzepek, 2007).     12
Consequently there is an intuitive appeal to exploit and foster synergies by integrating mitigation 
and adaptation.  
An excessive emphasis on synergies can present some risks as well (Klein et al., 2003, 2007; Dang 
et al., 2003; Tol, 2005). Adaptation measures could pose institutional or coordination difficulties, 
especially at the international level, and these may be transmitted to the implementation of 
mitigation measures if the two are conceived as tightly linked. Synergetic interventions can be less 
cost effective than separate mitigation, adaptation and especially (sustainable) development 
interventions. 
There are finally objective trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation (Tol, 2005, Bosello 2008, 
de Bruin et al. 2007). Resources are scarce: hence, if some are used for mitigation, less are available 
for adaptation, and vice versa. This particular point is clarified by Ingham et al. (2005a,b) who 
demonstrate that mitigation and adaptation are substitutes in economic terms, thus implying that if 
say the cost of mitigation falls, agents’ optimal response would be to increase mitigation and 
decrease adaptation.  
It is worth noting that substitutability is not in contradiction with the fact that mitigation and 
adaptation should be both used in climate change policies. Substitutability justifies an integrated 
approach to mitigation and adaptation as mitigation, or adaptation alone, cannot optimally deal with 
climate change. In the language of lay people they would be defined as complementary, but this is 
so also for instance in IPCC (1996), Pielke (1998). What they refer to is rather the idea that an 
increase in climate related damage cost would increase both mitigation and adaptation efforts, 
which is exactly the typical “income effect” with normal goods.
 Finally, as noted by Tol (2005), if 
adaptation is successful, a lower need to mitigate could be perceived. 
Turning to more case-specific examples, Klein et al. (2007) discuss many circumstances in which 
adaptation and mitigation can complement (facilitate) or substitute (conflict with) each other. In 
general each time adaptation implies an increased energy use from fossil sources, emissions will 
increase and mitigation becomes more costly. This is the case for instance of adaptation to changing 
hydrological regimes and water scarcity, through  increasing reuse of wastewater and the associated 
treatment, deep-well pumping, and especially large-scale desalination, which would increase energy 
use in the water sector, with subsequent increased emissions and mitigation costs (Boutkan and 
Stikker (2004) quoted by Klein et al., 2007), or the case of indoor cooling which is proposed as a 
typical adaptation in a warming world (Smith and Tirpak 1989, quoted by Klein et al., 2007).  
However, there are also adaptation practices which decrease energy use and thus facilitate 
mitigation (for instance, new design principles for commercial and residential buildings could 
simultaneously reduce vulnerability to extreme weather events and energy needs for heating and/or 
cooling). Carbon sequestration in agricultural soils highlights as well a positive link from mitigation 
to adaptation. It creates an economic commodity for farmers (sequestered carbon) and makes the 
land more valuable by improving soil and water conservation, thus enhancing both the economic 
and environmental components of adaptive capacity (Boehm et al., 2004; Butt and McCarl, 2004; 
Dumanski, 2004 quoted by Klein et al. 2007). 
There are finally ambiguous cases. For instance avoided forest degradation implies in most cases an 
increased adaptive capacity of ecosystems (through biodiversity preservation) and climate (non-
emissions) benefits. However, if incentives to sequester carbon by afforestation and reforestation 
spur an over-plantation of fast-growing alien species, biodiversity can be harmed (Caparros and 
Jacquemont 2003, quoted by Klein et al. 2007) and the natural system can become less adaptable. 
These examples demonstrate the intricate inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation, and 
also the links with other environmental concerns, such as water resources and biodiversity, with 
profound policy implications. 
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5. Adaptation strategies and macro, policy-driven, integrated measures 
 
Given the multifaceted features of adaptation, and the difficulty to compare the very different 
adaptation actions or even the same adaptation strategy in different locations, the choice of this 
study is to aggregate adaptation responses into three main categories: anticipatory adaptation, 
reactive adaptation and adaptation R&D.  
Anticipatory adaptation implies building a stock of defensive capital that must be ready when the 
damage materializes. It is subject to “economic inertia”: investment in defensive capital translates 
into protection capital after some years. Hence, it needs to be undertaken before the damage occurs. 
By contrast, reactive adaptation is immediately effective and it can be put in place when the damage 
effectively materializes.  
Reactive adaptation is represented by all those actions that need to be undertaken every period in 
response to those climate change damages that can not be or were not accommodated by 
anticipatory adaptation. They usually need to be constantly adjusted to changes in climatic 
conditions. Examples of these actions are energy expenditures for air conditioning or farmers’ 
yearly changes in seasonal crops’ mix.  
Investing in R&D and knowledge can be seen as a peculiar form of anticipatory adaptation. 
Innovation activity in adaptation or simply “knowledge adaptation” is represented by all those R&D 
activities and investments that make adaptation responses more effective. These are especially 
important in sectors such as agriculture and health, where the discovery of new crops and vaccines 
is crucial to reduce vulnerability to climate change (Barrett, 2008)
8.  
These three groups of adaptation measures will be contrasted one against the other and with 
mitigation in a cost benefit analysis in both a non-cooperative and cooperative (first-best) setting. 
The analysis will be conducted with the AD-WITCH model (see Appendix I for more information). 
AD-WITCH is a climate-economic, dynamic-optimization, Integrated Assessment model that can 
be solved under two alternative game-theoretic scenarios: 
•  In a non-cooperative scenario, each of the 12 regions in which the world is disaggregated 
maximises its own private welfare (defined as the present value of the logarithm of per capita 
consumption), taking other regions’ choices as given. This yields a Nash equilibrium, which is 
also chosen as the baseline. In this context, externalities are not internalized. 
•  In a cooperative scenario, a benevolent social planner maximizes global welfare, i.e. takes into 
account the full social cost of climate change. In this scenario, the first best cooperative 
outcome in which all externalities are internalized can be achieved. 
The climate change damage function used by the AD-WITCH model includes a reduced-form 
relationship between temperature and gross world product which follows closely Nordhaus and 
Boyer (2000), both in the functional form and in the parameter values. The resulting patterns of 
regional damages are thus in line with what depicted in Tables 1 and 2. Higher losses are estimated 
in developing countries: in South Asia (including India) and Sub-Saharan Africa, especially because 
of higher damages in agriculture, from vector-borne diseases and because of catastrophic climate 
impacts. 
Damage estimates in agriculture, coastal settlements and catastrophic climate impacts are 
significant in Western Europe, resulting in higher damages than in other developed regions. In 
China, Eastern EU countries, non-EU Eastern European countries (including Russia), Japan-Korea, 
climate change up to 2.5°C would bring small benefits, essentially because of a reduction in energy 
                                                 
8 To test the generality of results, Appendix III proposes an alternative specification in which R&D contributes to build 
“adaptive capacity” that improves the effectiveness of all adaptation actions be they proactive or reactive.   14
demand for heating purposes (non-EU Eastern European countries including Russia) or positive 
effects on agricultural productivity (China).  
Nonetheless recent evidence - an important contribution on this is the 2007 Stern Review, but also 
UNFCCC (2007) and the IPCC’s AR4 (IPCC, 2007) - suggests that climate change damages may 
probably be higher than the values proposed in the RICE model by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
Probably, the most important reason is that RICE, as well as AD-WITCH and many other IA 
models), only partially captures non-market impacts, which are confined to the recreational value of 
leisure. Important climate related impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem losses or on cultural 
heritage are not part of the damage assessment. 
 
Secondly the model abstracts from very rapid warming and large-scale changes of the climate 
system (“system” surprises). As a consequence, AD-WITCH yields climate related impacts that, on 
average, are smaller than those described in studies like the 2007 Stern Review or the UNFCCC 
(2007) report, which do consider the possibility of abrupt climate changes. 
 
Thirdly, the time horizon considered in this report also plays also a role. The longer it is, the larger 
the observed damages from climate change, as temperature is projected to keep an increasing trend. 
Like most IAMs, AD-WITCH considers the dynamics of economic and climatic variables up to 
2150, while, for instance, the Stern Review reaches the year 2200.  
 
Finally, the AD_WITCH model is partly based on out-of-date evidence, as many regional estimates 
contained in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) are extrapolations from studies that have been carried out 
for one or two regions, typically the United States.  
 
In order to account for new evidence on climate-related damages and economic impacts, the cost-
benefit analysis of adaptation has been performed under two different specifications of the damage 
functions. The standard one, based on the assessments contained in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
And a new one, characterised by a much higher damage from climate change, about twice the 
standard one. This new specification of the damage function yields values of damages larger than 
those contained in UNFCCC (2007) and close to those in Stern (2007).  
As suggested by Stern (2007), we have also assessed the benefit cost ratios of adaptation under two 
possible values of the pure rate of time preference. The standard one, again based on Nordhaus and 
Boyer (2000), is equal to 3% declining over time. The new one is much lower and equal to 0.1%, as 
in Stern (2007)). Still the AD-WITCH model does not perform a risk assessment on threshold 
effects or on discontinuous low probability high damage impacts, which go beyond the scope of this 
report
9.  
Summing up, four cases will be considered when analyzing the costs and benefits of mitigation, 
adaptation and of different types of adaptation: 
 
1.  LDAM_HDR : low damage – high discount rate. This is the baseline scenario with a 
discount rate set initially at 3% and then declining over time as in WITCH, DICE and RICE 
(see Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). 
                                                 
9 However, it is likely that the general conclusions of the present study would not change. What can change is the 
relative weight of adaptation and mitigation in the optimal policy mix. As adaptation to catastrophic events can only be 
partial, and given that the probability of their occurrence can be lowered only by reducing temperature increase, 
mitigation could become more appealing than adaptation when the occurrence of catastrophic events is accounted for. 
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2.  LDAM_LDR:  low damage – low discount rate. The damage is the same as in the baseline; 
the discount rate is 0.1% and then declining, as in Stern (2007).  
3.  HDAM_LDR:  high damage – low high discount. The damage is about twice the damage in 
baseline; the discount rare is 0.1% and then declining, as in the Stern Review.  
4.  HDAM_HDR: high damage – high discount rate. The damage is about twice the damage in 
baseline; the discount rate is 3% and then declining over time as in WITCH, DICE and 
RICE. 
 
5.1. Optimal integrated climate-change strategy in a non cooperative setting. 
  
The main strategic difference between mitigation and adaptation responses to global warming can 
be summarized as follows. Mitigation provides a public good that can be enjoyed globally, while 
adaptation provides private or club goods. Mitigation is thus affected by the well known “free 
riding” curse, while this is much less of an issue for adaptation.  
 
In the absence of climate change international cooperation, climate change policies at the regional 
level are chosen to equalize marginal private benefits and marginal private costs, without 
internalizing negative externalities imposed globally. Because of the free-riding incentive, little 
mitigation effort is thus undertaken.  
 
In practice, in a non-cooperative scenario, when both adaptation and mitigation are chosen 
optimally, equilibrium abatement (mitigation) is so low that emissions almost coincide with the no 
policy case (Figure 5, left). Optimal (non-cooperative) adaptation reduces climate change damages 
and therefore provides an incentive to increase emissions compared to the no policy case (non-
cooperative no policy scenario). By contrast, the full appropriability of benefits from adaptation 
induces regional planners to implement adaptation measures even in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Expenditures for adaptation reach 3.2 USD trillion or 0.8% of world GDP in 2100 
(Figure 5, right). Cumulated over the century and discounted at the 3% discount rate, they total 
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Figure 6 shows total climate change damage (residual damages + adaptation expenditure) in the 
absence of any policy. It amounts to an annual average of 584 USD billion already in 2035, and 
increases exponentially over time. Adaptation reduces substantively residual damages (see again 
Figure 6), up to 55% in 2100. Adaptation starts slowly in the first two decades. Consistently with 
the AD-WITCH damage function, damages from climate change are indeed low in the first two 
decades. Hence, adaptation, typically addressing current and near-term damages, is only marginally 
needed. This applies also to anticipatory adaptation. Economic inertia in the model is about five 
years. As a consequence, adaptation investments do not need to start too in advance. When 
considering higher damages and higher preferences for the future (the high damage and low 
discount rate case), adaptation starts earlier - already in 2020 60 USD billions are allocated to the 
reduction of damage. Hence, total damage reduction increases – it amounts to more than 70% in 
2100 (see Figure 7). 
 
 






























































Non cooperative no policy - Residual damage  (LDAM_HDR)
Non cooperative with adaptation and mitigation - Adaptation expenditure (LDAM_HDR)
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Non cooperative with adaptation and mitigation - Residual damage (HDAM_LDR)
Non cooperative with adaptation and mitigation - Adaptation expenditure (HDAM_LDR)
Non cooperative no policy - Residual damage (HDAM_LDR)
Total climate change cost (HDAM_LDR)  
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The benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) of adaptation, measured as the discounted sum of avoided damages 
over the discounted sum of total adaptation expenditures, are reported in Table 4. On a sufficiently 
long-term perspective, they are larger than one. Had we chosen a longer time period they could 
have been even higher, as in the model benefits increase more than costs, due to the stronger 
convexity of the damage function with respect to the adaptation cost function
10.  
 
Figure 4 also shows adaptation BCRs increase more when climate damage increases than when the 
discount rate decreases. When damages become more relevant all along the simulation period and 
not only at its later stages, adaptation becomes relatively more useful. 
 
 
Table 4. Benefit-cost ratios of adaptation in four scenarios  
(non-cooperative scenario with adaptation and mitigation) 
 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR  LDAM_LDR  HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  16 62  227  695 
Costs   10 25  134  270 
BCR  1.67 2.41  1.69  2.57 
 
Benefits are measured as total discounted avoided damages compared to the non cooperative no policy case 




Summing up: the theoretical insight
11 that, in a non-cooperative setting, adaptation is the main 
climate policy tool is confirmed by our results. Mitigation is negligible at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. As a consequence, adaptation investments are high and increasing over time. Most 
importantly, the benefit-cost ratio is larger than one. Higher emissions in the presence of adaptation, 
and the relatively higher sensitivity of adaptation to the level of climate damages, already highlight 
the potential strategic complementarity between mitigation and adaptation. This issue will be 
addressed more deeply in the next sections. 
 
 
5.2. An optimal integrated climate-change strategy in a cooperative scenario. 
 
In a cooperative scenario, all externalities originated by emissions are internalized. Accordingly, 
emission abatement (mitigation) is considerably higher than in the non-cooperative scenario (Figure 
8, left). Adaptation is still undertaken, but slightly less than in the non cooperative case (Figure 8, 
right). Higher cooperative mitigation efforts reduce the need to adapt with respect to the non 
cooperative scenario. This result is robust to different discount factors and damage levels (see 
Figure 9). 
 
As expected, abatement is further increased when the discount rate decreases or the damage from 
climate change increases. Adaptation is reduced accordingly. This effect is not “proportional” to 
emission reduction though. The “discounting” effect, which tends to favor mitigation by increasing 
the weight of future damages, is partly offset by the “damage” effect, which increases future and 
present damages and calls for both mitigation and adaptation. 
                                                 
10 This result is driven by our model assumptions, which are anchored on calibration data.  
11 There is an extensive literature on international environmental agreements showing the non cooperative abatement 
level is negligible at the equilibrium. Therefore, adaptation remains the only option to reduce climate danages.   18
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Figure 9: Effects of mitigation on adaptation 
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The trade-off between optimal mitigation and adaptation emerges also when analyzing cooperative 
mitigation with and without adaptation. As shown by Figure 10, adaptation reduces the need to 
mitigate, i.e. cooperative emissions in the presence of adaptation are higher. Nonetheless, even in 
the presence of adaptation, which can potentially reduce by 50% climate change damage, mitigation 
remains an important and far from negligible component of the optimal response to climate change.  
 
After 2050, on a 5-year average, optimal emission reduction is approximately 17% compared to the 
no policy case. This stresses again the strategic complementarity between mitigation and adaptation. 
Both reduce climate-related damages. Therefore their integration can increase total welfare (proxied 
by cumulated discounted consumption) as shown by Figure 11. Notice also that cumulated 
consumption decreases less by giving up adaptation than mitigation. Indeed, investments in 
(proactive) adaptation crowd out consumption. This effect is amplified by the discounting process 
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Figure 10: CO2 emissions 






























































































































Further information on the relation between mitigation and adaptation is provided by Table 5. In 
2100, mitigation cuts the potential climatic damage by roughly 3 USD trillion, whereas adaptation 
by nearly 8 USD trillion. Interestingly, the two strategies, when jointly chosen, reduce climate 
change damages by 8.2 USD trillion, which is less than the sum of what the two strategies could 
accomplish if adopted separately. Mitigation and adaptation remain indeed competing strategies. On 
the benefit side, because adaptation reduces the marginal benefit of mitigation. And on the cost side, 
because both compete for scarce resources. Accordingly, when they are used jointly, there is a 
lower incentive to use each of the two. 
 
Table 5. Strategic complementarity between adaptation and mitigation 
 
Damage reduction in the cooperative case wrt baseline (2005 USD trillion) 
 
   Mitigation only  Adaptation only  Sum   Adaptation & Mitigation  Interaction effect 
2035 0.04  0.00  0.05  0.04  0.00 
2050 0.20  0.10  0.30  0.23  -0.06 
2075 0.99  2.24  3.23  2.43  -0.80 
2100 3.05  7.92  10.97  8.23  -2.74 
   20
 
 
Table 6. Timing of adaptation and mitigation in a cooperative scenario  
 
2035 2050  2100 
Adaptation 
(Total protection costs – Billion USD 2005)  2 78  2838 
 
Mitigation 
(emission % change wrt BaU)  -18.8% -18.7%  -15.1% 
 
 
Table 6 highlights another important  difference  between  adaptation  and  mitigation:  their 
timing. Mitigation starts well in advance with respect to adaptation. Abatement is substantial when 
adaptation expenditure is still low. Mitigation needs to be implemented earlier than adaptation. It 
works “through” carbon cycle inertia. Accordingly action needs to start soon to grasp some benefits 
in the future. By contrast, adaptation measures work “through” the much shorter economic inertia, 
and can thus be implemented when relevant damages occur, which is from the third decade of the 
century. 
 
Table 7 disentangles the effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation when they are chosen optimally. 
It shows clearly that mitigation is preferred when the discount rate is low, whereas adaptation 
prevails when damages are high. 
 
 
Table 7: Damage reduction due to different strategies 
LDAM_LDR  Mitigation&Adaptation Mitigation Adaptation 
2050 34%  31%  3% 
2075 56%  39%  17% 
2100 72%  45%  27% 
LDAM_HDR  Mitigation&Adaptation Mitigation Adaptation 
2050 14%  11%  3% 
2075 39%  11%  28% 
2100 59%  9%  50% 
HDAM_LDR  Mitigation&Adaptation Mitigation Adaptation 
2050 49%  32%  17% 
2075 72%  43%  29% 
2100 82%  47%  35% 
HDAM_HDR  Mitigation&Adaptation Mitigation Adaptation 
2050 33%  12%  21% 
2075 61%  10%  51% 




Table 8 shows the benefit-cost ratio of adaptation in the non cooperative and in the cooperative 
scenarios. The benefit-cost ratio of adaptation improves when it is optimally complemented by 
mitigation
12. This is another way of expressing the rule that two instruments are better than one 
instrument at the first best, i.e. (net) welfare can be enhanced by increasing the degrees of freedom 
                                                 
12 This happens also to mitigation, not shown.    21
of the policymaker. When combined, both adaptation and mitigation can “better” be used than in 
isolation, i.e. with a higher BCR.  
 
 
Table 8: Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of adaptation and of joint adaptation mitigation 
 
  BCR adaptation   BCR joint adaptation and mitigation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105 
Non 
cooperative Cooperative Cooperative 
Benefits  16 14  19 
Costs  10 8  9 
BCR  1.67 1.73  2.11 
  Benefits are measured as discounted avoided damages compared to non-cooperative no policy case 
  Adaptation costs are measured as discounted expenditures on adaptation 
Mitigation costs are measured as additional investments in carbon-free technologies and energy efficiency compared to 
the non-cooperative no policy case 
 
 
The sensitivity analysis reported in Table 9 highlights that adaptation becomes more profitable 
when climate related damages increase. Indeed, compared to mitigation which reduces mainly 
future damages, adaptation is more rapidly effective on contrasting future and present damages. 
Accordingly, in a “high damage world” (but without climate catastrophes), adaptation becomes the 
preferred strategy and this is reflected in an increasing benefit-cost ratio. When the discount rate 
declines, the opposite occurs: future damages become more relevant; mitigation is thus preferred; 
the benefit-cost ratio of adaptation declines accordingly. As shown in Table 7, with low discounting 
a larger share of damage reduction is achieved with mitigation. Similar results hold also when 
adaptation and mitigation are implemented jointly.  
 
 
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis. Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR)  
of adaptation and of joint adaptation and mitigation in the cooperative scenario  
 
Adaptation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR LDAM_LDR HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  14 55 99  337 
Costs  8 21  65  144 
BCR  1.73 2.63 1.52 2.33 
Joint adaptation and mitigation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR LDAM_LDR HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  19 67  294  811 
Costs  10 24  266  347 
BCR  1.93 2.82 1.10 2.34 
 
 
Summing up, mitigation and adaptation are strategic complements. Therefore, they should be 
integrated in a welfare maximizing climate policy. It is worth stressing again that the possibility to 
mitigate (adapt) reduces, but does not eliminate, the need to adapt (mitigate). The optimal climate 
policy mix is composed by both mitigation and adaptation measures. The benefit cost ratio of a 
policy mix where adaptation and mitigation are optimally integrated is larger that the one in which 
mitigation and adaptation are implemented alone. 
 




5.3. Unraveling the optimal adaptation strategy mix: 
 
The analysis performed so far does not disentangle the role of different adaptation strategies. This is 
the aim of this section. Let us consider first the relationship between proactive (anticipatory) and 
reactive adaptation. As shown by Figure 12 and Table 10, the non cooperative and the cooperative 
scenarios highlight the same qualitative behavior: not surprisingly anticipatory adaptation is 
undertaken in advance with respect to reactive adaptation.  
Consequently, until 2085 the bulk of adaptation expenditure is devoted to anticipatory measures; 
reactive adaptation becomes the major budget item afterwards. This is the optimal response to 
climate damage dynamics. When it is sufficiently low, it is worth preparing to face future damages. 
When eventually it becomes high and increasing, larger amount of resources need to be invested in 
reactive interventions, coping with what cannot be accommodated ex ante.  
 
Figure 12: Scale and timing of adaptation investments 
 









































































































REACTIVE ADAPTATION ANTICIPATORY ADAPTATION
KNOWLEDGE (RH axes)


















































































































Reactive Adaptation  0.2%  0.6% 
Anticipatory Adaptation  99.6%  99.1% 






Reactive Adaptation  19.5%  17.2% 
Anticipatory Adaptation  80.3%  82.6% 






Reactive Adaptation  56.8%  55.8% 
Anticipatory Adaptation  42.7%  43.8% 
Knowledge Adaptation  0.5%  0.5%   23
 
 
Notice that investments in adaptation R&D show a behavior similar to anticipatory adaptation, but 
the scale of dedicated resources is much smaller. This result depends on the calibration data: we 
relied on quantitative estimates provided by UNFCCC (2007) on the aggregate amount of money 
that could be spent on R&D in agriculture, which is estimated to be around 7 USD Billion in 2060, 
a very tiny amount compared to world GDP
13.  
The results shown in Figure 12 and Table 10 are based on the full availability of resources and 
political consensus to implement the optimal policy mix. What happens when first best options are 
not available? In other words, what kind of adaptation strategy should a decision maker prefer were 
he/she forced to make a choice between different adaptation measures because of resource scarcity? 
The answer to this question is summarized by Table 11. It reports the benefit-cost ratio when either 
one of the three options is foregone.  
 
Table 11: Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of adaptation strategy mix in the cooperative scenario 
 
Option excluded from the 
optimal mix 
 
USD 2005 Billion 




    Anticipatory 
    Adaptation 
Knowledge 
Adaptation 
Benefits  789 7.4  13657 
Costs  771 5.7  7938 
 
BCR  1.02 1.30  1.72 
 
If just only one adaptation strategy were to be chosen, reactive adaptation should be privileged. 
Indeed, the non implementation of reactive adaptation would induce a worsening of the benefit cost 
ratio of the whole climate change strategy by 41% (and by 45% in welfare terms). By contrast, the 
impossibility to use anticipatory adaptation would decrease the benefit cost ratio by 24% (33% in 
welfare term). 
R&D adaptation appears to be the less crucial adaptation option. But this depends on the way it is 
modeled. R&D adaptation improves the productivity of reactive adaptation. Hence, its elimination 
does not impair excessively reactive adaptation itself. Appendix III illustrates an alternative 
formulation in which R&D augments the productivity of both proactive and reactive adaptation and 
in which adaptation R&D investments are therefore much larger.  Nonetheless, all other conclusions 
are robust to changes in the model specification as described in Appendix III.     
 
5.4. Regional analysis 
 
In order to provide insights on regional specificities, this section disaggregates the above results 
between developed and developing countries. Even this broad disaggregation is sufficient to 
highlight substantial differences.  
Figure 13 and Table 12 stress the higher vulnerability and the higher need to adapt of developing 
countries. Not surprisingly, NON-OECD countries spend a higher share of their GDP on adaptation 
                                                 
13 UNFCCC (2007) provides estimates for 2030. We scale this number up proportionally to the temperature gap 
between 2030 and our reference 2.5°C, which is our calibration point.   24
than OECD countries.  This is driven by their higher damages – by the end of the century, also in 
absolute terms, optimal adaptation expenditure is nearly 5 times higher in NON-OECD than in 
OECD countries – and by their lower GDP.  
 


























































































































































































































Table 12: Adaptation and mitigation in OECD and NON-OECD regions in the cooperative scenario 
 
 OECD  NON  OECD 
  2035 
Reactive Adaptation (USD Billion)  0  0 
Anticipatory Adaptation (USD Billion)  0  2 
Knowledge Adaptation (USD Billion)  0  0 
Total Adaptation expenditure (USD Billion)  0  2 
Mitigation (emission reduction %)  -24%  -15% 
 2050 
Reactive Adaptation (USD Billion)  0  13 
Anticipatory Adaptation (USD Billion)  2  62 
Knowledge Adaptation (USD Billion)  0  0 
Total Adaptation expenditure (USD Billion)  2  76 
Mitigation (emission reduction %)  -24%  -16% 
 2100 
Reactive Adaptation (USD Billion)  62  1520 
Anticipatory Adaptation (USD Billion)  421  821 
Knowledge Adaptation (USD Billion)  11  2 
Total Adaptation expenditure (USD Billion)  494  2344 
Mitigation (emission reduction %)  -18%  -14% 
 
 
It is also worth noting the different composition and timing of the optimal adaptation mix between 
the two regions. NON-OECD countries rely mainly on reactive measures, which in 2100 contribute 
to 65% of total adaptation expenditure, whereas OECD countries focus on anticipatory measures, 
which constitute 85% of their total expenditure on adaptation. As for the timing, adaptation in 
NON-OECD is undertaken much earlier than in OECD regions.  
The different composition of adaptation responses depends upon two facts
14 : firstly, the regional 
characteristics of climate vulnerability. In OECD countries, the higher share of climate change 
                                                 
14 More on the calibration procedure can be found in Appendix I and in another Annex available upon request.   25
damages originates from loss of infrastructures and coastal areas, whose protection requires a form 
of adaptation that is largely anticipatory. In NON-OECD countries, a higher share of damages 
originates from agriculture, health, and the energy sectors (space heating and cooling). These 
damages can be accommodated more effectively through reactive measures. 
Secondly, OECD countries are richer. Thus, they can give up relatively more easily their present 
consumption to invest in adaptation measures that will become productive in the future. By contrast, 
NON-OECD countries are compelled by resource scarcity to act “in emergency”.   
Only the expenditure on adaptation R&D is higher in OECD countries than in NON-OECD 
countries. Data on R&D and innovation aimed at improving the effectiveness of adaptation are very 
scarce. Starting from OECD (2007), we decided to distribute adaptation R&D to different regions 
on the basis of current expenditure on total R&D, which is concentrated in OECD countries. This 
explains why adaptation R&D investments in developing countries in 2100 is roughly 1/10 and 1/5 
of that of developed regions – as a share of their GDP and in absolute terms, respectively.  
 
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis. Benefit-Cost Ratio of adaptation  
and of joint adaptation and mitigation in the cooperative scenario – OECD regions 
 
Adaptation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR LDAM_LDR HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  2.2 16 14 93 
Costs  1.5 5.9 12  39 
BCR  1.45 2.64 1.12 2.38 
Joint adaptation and mitigation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR LDAM_LDR HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  4.2 21 68 238 
Costs  1.8 6.6 146  164 
BCR  2.23 3.17 0.46 1.45 
 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity analysis. Benefit-Cost Ratio of adaptation  
and of joint adaptation and mitigation in the cooperative scenario – NON-OECD regions 
 
Adaptation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR LDAM_LDR HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  11 40 86  243 
Costs  6 15  53  105 
BCR  1.79 2.63 1.61 2.31 
Joint adaptation and mitigation 
USD 2005 Trillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  LDAM_HDR HDAM_HDR LDAM_LDR HDAM_LDR 
Benefits  15 46  226  573 
Costs  6.9 16 128  183 
BCR  2.11 2.85 1.77 3.13 
 
 
Table 13 and 14 show the benefit-cost ratio of adaptation, and of adaptation and mitigation jointly. 
In NON-OECD countries, the combination of the two strategies always show a higher benefit-cost   26
ratio than adaptation alone (Table 14). By contrast, in OECD regions (Table 13) this remains true 
only with a high discount rate. With a lower discounting, mitigation increases its weight in the 
policy mix. The additional effort undertaken by OECD countries, which is the group of countries 
investing more on low carbon technologies, benefits mostly NON-OECD regions. In other words, 
in a cooperative setting OECD countries are called to abate partly on behalf of NON-OECD 
countries. For example, consider the low damage, low discount case (LDAM_LDR). Global 
benefits of joint adaptation and mitigation amount at 294 USD trillion (see Table 9). 75% of these 
benefits occurs in NON-OECD countries, for a total benefit of 226 USD trillion, whereas OECD 
countries receive the remaining 25% (68 USD trillion), though they bear slightly higher costs. 
Again, what happens if first best options were not fully available? If just only one adaptation 
strategy were to be chosen, anticipatory adaptation should be privileged by OECD countries, 
whereas NON-OECD should prioritize expenditure on reactive adaptation (see Table 15). 
Indeed, the elimination of anticipatory adaptation from the adaptation option basket of OECD 
countries induces a worsening of the benefit-cost ratio of the whole climate change strategy equal to 
72%. The impossibility to use reactive adaptation in NON-OECD countries reduces the overall 
benefit-cost ratio by 48% (Table 15).  
The difference between developing and developed regions is notable. Foregoing reactive adaptation 
is much more damaging for developing than for developed countries, consistently with what 
observed about the regional structure of damages and the adaptation expenditure, whereas the 
opposite holds for anticipatory adaptation. Again, R&D adaptation appears to be the adaptation 
option one can give up less regretfully.  
 
 
Table 15: Marginal contribution of specific policy-driven strategies 
 
  WORLD        OECD  NONOECD 
Reactive adaptation  -41% -29%  -48% 
Anticipatory adaptation  -24% -72%  -24% 




These results, although driven by our model specification and calibration, contain some preliminary 
policy implications: 
 
-  OECD countries invest heavily in anticipatory adaptation measures. This depends on their 
damage structure. Planned anticipatory adaptation is particularly suited to cope with sea-
level rise, but also with hydro geological risks induced by more frequent and intense 
extreme events, which are a major source of negative impacts in the developed economies. 
Thus, it is more convenient to act ex ante rather than ex post in OECD countries. 
 
-  In NON-OECD countries, climate change adaptation needs are presently relatively low, but 
will rise dramatically after the mid-century, as long as climate change damages will 
increase. In 2050, they could amount to 78 USD Billion, in 2065 they will be above 500 
USD billion to peak to more than 2 USD trillion by the end of the century. It is sufficient to 
recall that in 2007 total ODA were slightly above 100 USD billion to understand by how 
much climate change can stress adaptive capacity in the developing world. NON-OECD 
countries are unlikely to have the resources to meet their adaptation needs, which calls for 
international aid and cooperation on adaptation to climate change. 
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-  At the equilibrium, NON-OECD countries place little effort on adaptation R&D and rely 
primarily on reactive adaptation. This outcome however depends on the particular structure 
of NON-OECD economic systems. Being poor, other forms of adaptation expenditures, 
more rapidly effective, mainly of the reactive type, are to be preferred. This suggests that 
richer countries can help developing countries also by supporting their adaptation R&D (e.g. 
by technology transfers) and their adaptation planning.  
 
 
6. A comparison with the existing modelling literature 
 
The modelling literature that analyses the optimal investments in adaptation, their time profile and 
the trade-off between adaptation and mitigation is thin and still mainly in the “grey” area. To our 
knowledge, it is confined to Hope (1993, 2007), Bosello (2008), de Bruin et al. (2007), de Bruin, 
Dellink and Agrawala (2009). 
 
In the PAGE model (Hope, 1993, 2007) adaptive policies operate in three ways: they increase the 
slope of the tolerable temperature profile, its plateau, and finally they can decrease the adverse 
impact of climate change when the temperature eventually exceeds the tolerable threshold. 
However, adaptation is exogenously imposed and costs and benefits are given: the “default” 
adaptation strategy has a cost in the EU of  3, 12 and 25 US billion$/year (min., mode and max. 
respectively) to achieve an increase of 1°C of temperature tolerability and of additional 0.4, 1.6, 3.2 
US billion $/year to achieve a 1% reduction in climate change impacts. At the world level, this 
implies, at a discount rate of  3% declining, a cost of nearly 3 trillion of US $ to achieve a damage 
reduction of roughly US $35 trillions within the period 2000-2200. Impact reduction ranges from 
90% in the OECD to 50% elsewhere.  
 
With the given assumptions, the PAGE model could easily justify aggressive adaptation policies 
(see e.g. Hope et al., 1993), implicitly decreasing the appeal of mitigation. Due to the huge 
uncertainty about cost and effectiveness of adaptation, more than questioning the credibility of these 
assumptions, it is worth emphasising that, in the PAGE model adaptation is exogenous. It is not 
determined by the model, but decided at the outset. Accordingly, mitigation and adaptation cannot 
be really compared in an optimizing framework.   
 
De Bruin et al. (2007) enrich the Nordhaus (1994) DICE model with explicit cost and benefit 
functions of a world adaptation strategy. They model adaptation as a flow variable: it needs to be 
adjusted period by period, but also, once adopted in one period, it does not affect damages in the 
next period. De Bruin et al. (2007) show that adaptation and mitigation are strategic complements: 
optimal policy consists of a mix of adaptation measures and investments in mitigation. This result 
holds also in the short-term, even though mitigation will only decrease damages in later periods. 
Adaptation is the main climate change cost reducer until 2100, whereas mitigation prevails 
afterwards. In addition, it is shown that benefits of adaptation are higher than those of mitigation 
until 2130. 
The authors highlight the trade-off between the two strategies: the introduction of mitigation 
decreases the need to adapt and vice versa. However, the second effect is notably stronger than the 
first one. Indeed, mitigation lowers only slightly climate related damages, especially in the short-
medium term. Therefore, it does little to decrease the need to adapt, particularly during the first 
decades. 
Sensitivity over the discount rate points out that mitigation becomes relatively more preferable as 
the discount rate becomes lower. Intuitively, mitigation reduces long-term climatic damages: thus, it 
becomes the preferred policy instrument as these damages become more relevant.     28
All these results are consolidated in de Bruin et al. (2009), which repeat the analysis with an 
updated calibration of adaptation costs and benefits and propose also regional results. They show 
that in terms of utility for low level of damages adapting only is preferable than mitigating only. 
However, the relationship is reversed when climate damages increase.  
Bosello (2008) compares adaptation and mitigation using the FEEM-RICE model (Buonanno et al. 
2000), a modified version of Nordahus’ RICE 1996 model in which technical progress is 
endogenous. Differently from De Bruin et al. (2007) and de Bruin and Dellink (2009), adaptation is 
modelled as a stock of “defensive capital” that is accrued over time by a periodical protection 
investment. Firstly, it is shown that mitigation should be optimally implemented in early periods 
whereas adaptation should be postponed to later stages. Accordingly, and this is the first key 
qualitative difference with de Bruin et al. (2007), the main damage reducer is mitigation and not 
adaptation at least in the first decades. Mitigation has to be anticipated because of its delayed effects 
driven by environmental inertia; adaptation can be postponed partly because it is more rapidly 
effective, but mainly because it is not worth reducing consumption by investing in adaptation when 
damage is low. Adaptation becomes cost efficient only when climate related damage is sufficiently 
high. 
The second important difference with respect to de Bruin et al. (2007) is that when climate damage 
becomes large, albeit both adaptation and mitigation increase, the share of total damage reduction 
due adaptation increases. In Bosello (2008) adaptation does not “vanishes” after one period as in de 
Bruin et al. (2007). Therefore, it is more cost effective to cope with incremental damages than in De 
Bruin et al. (2007).  
In all the aforementioned papers, adaptation emerges as a powerful strategy to cope with climate 
change damage. However, irrespectively of its effectiveness, mitigation is always undertaken. 
Mitigation and adaptation are again strategic complements. They are also economic substitutes: 
more investments in mitigation reduce the equilibrium expenditure in adaptation, and vice versa. 
However, mitigation is more responsive to adaptation than vice versa. Finally, an increased 
(decreased) inter-temporal preference for the future (a lower (higher) discount rate) shifts the policy 
emphasis into mitigation (adaptation).  
 
7. Assessing the role of market driven adaptation 
The analysis conducted so far abstracted from any role potentially played by market-driven 
adaptation. In other words, either the economic impact assessment or the design of the optimal mix 
between mitigation and adaptation strategies are based on damage functions not accounting for 
behavioural changes induced by “market or welfare changes in human systems”. 
Modelling and then quantifying market-driven adaptation is extremely challenging. In economic 
terms, this means representing supply and demand reactions to scarcity signals conveyed by prices 
and triggered by climate-related impacts. Even assuming a satisfactory knowledge of these impacts, 
this requires to assessing substitution elasticities in consumers preferences and transformation 
elasticities in production functions for all goods and services. This needs then to be coupled with a 
realistic picture of inter-sectoral and international trade flows. Some seminal studies in this field 
exist, which try to capture the autonomous reactions of demand and supply to climate-induced 
changes in relative prices and/or in the availability of resources. Most studies use applied or 
computable general equilibrium models (see, for example, Bosello et al. (2006), Bigano et al. 
(2008), Deke et al. (2001), Darwin and Tol (2001)). 
Initially, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models were developed mainly to analyze 
international trade policies and, partially, public sector economic issues (e.g. fiscal policies). Soon, 
because of their great flexibility, they became a common tool for economists to investigate the   29
consequences of the most diverse economic “perturbations”, including those provoked by climate 
change. Indeed, notwithstanding its complexity, as long as climate-related physical impacts can be 
translated into a change in productivity, production or demand for the different inputs and outputs 
of the model, their GDP implications can be determined by a CGE model
15.  
The structure of an integrated climate impact assessment exercise within a general equilibrium 
framework is presented in Figure 14. Economics is not independent from other disciplines, in 
particular it comes into play only after climatic changes have been translated into physical 
consequences (impacts) and then into changes of activities relevant for human welfare. 
   




Using a CGE approach for the economic evaluation of climate impacts implies an explicit 
modelling of sectors and of trade of production factors, goods and services. Changes in relative 
prices induce sectoral adjustments and changes in trade flows, thus triggering autonomous 
adaptation all over the world economic system.     
Studies in this field however share one or both of the following shortcomings: they analyse climate 
change impacts in a static framework; and they consider only one or very limited number of 
impacts. A static approach fails to capture important cumulative effects - think e.g. to a loss of 
productive capital that need to be compensated by an increased investment rate – thus it is severely 
limited especially to analyse long-term climate impacts. As to the second issue, albeit some market-
driven adaptation mechanisms can be described even in a single-impact case, interactions among 
impacts and the full potential of market-driven adaptation are neglected by focusing on one or few 
impacts. 
A recent research effort conducted at FEEM tackled these two limitations. ICES, a recursive-
dynamic CGE model, has been developed and then used as investigation tool to analyse the higher 
order costs of an extended set of climate-related impacts (see Table 16) considered one at a time, 
                                                 
15 In principle CGE model offer also the possibility to measure welfare changes captured by changes in indicators other 
than GDP, like the Hicksian equivalent variation or consumers’ surplus from a pre- to a post-perturbation state. 
However, great care should be placed on their interpretation. Here it is sufficient to mention that CGE models only 
partially capture changes in stock values (like property), and that they usually miss non market aspects to understand the 
important limitation of these assessments. Nevertheless a CGE approach has the merit to depict explicitly resource re-
location, a crucial aspect of which is international trade, which is not captured by traditional direct costing 
methodologies.    30
but also jointly. The study is still in a preliminary phase (many relevant impacts have still to be 
included, moreover the methodological approach can be improved by a more realistic representation 
of many features of market functioning) however it can already offer an interesting glimpse of the 
possible role played by market-driven adaptation.  
In this study, the ICES model replicates the same geographical disaggregation of the WITCH and 
AD-WITCH models. The only difference is that WITCH’s WEURO (Western Europe) region is 
now divided into Mediterranean and Northern Europe, while WITCH’s MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) region is split into Middle East and North Africa. Seventeen production sectors are 
considered in our analysis (see Table 17). 
 
Table 16. Impacts analyzed with the ICES model 
Supply- side impacts 
Impact on labour quantity (change in mortality – health effect of climate change) 
Impacts on labour productivity (change in morbidity – health effect of climate change) 
Impacts on land quantity (land loss due to sea level rise) 
Impacts on land productivity (Yield changes due to temperature and CO2 concentration 
changes) 
Demand-side impacts 
Impacts on energy demand (change in households energy consumption patterns for heating 
and cooling) 
Impacts on recreational services demand (change in tourism flows induced by climate change) 
Impacts on health care expenditure 
 
Table 17. Regional and sectoral disaggregation of the ICES model 
REGIONAL DISAGGREGATION OF THE ICES MODEL (this study) 
USA: United  States 
Med_Europe: Mediterranean  Europe 
North_Europe: Northern  Europe 
East_Europe: Eastern  Europe 
FSU: Former  Soviet  Union 
KOSAU:  Korea, S. Africa, Australia 
CAJANZ:  Canada, Japan, New Zealand 
NAF: North  Africa 
MDE: Middle  East 
SSA:  Sub Saharan Africa 
SASIA:  India and South Asia 
CHINA: China 
EASIA: East  Asia 
LACA:  Latin and Central America 
SECTORAL DISAGGREGATION OF THE ICES MODEL (this study) 
Rice Gas 
Wheat Oil  Products 
Other Cereal Crops  Electricity 
Vegetable Fruits  Water 
Animals Energy  Intensive  industries 
Forestry Other  industries 
Fishing Market  Services 
Coal Non-Market  Services 
Oil    31
The model, running from 2001-2050, has been calibrated to replicate regional GDP growth paths 
consistent with the A2 IPCC scenario, and has then been used to assess climate change economic 
impacts for 1.2 and 3.1 °C increase in 2050 wrt 2000, which is the likely temperature range 
associated to that scenario. The difference between these values and initial direct costs provides an 
indication of the possible role of autonomous adaptation. This information then allowed to calibrate 
world and macro-regional climate change damage functions by explicitly considering market driven 
adaptation. 
Our main results can be summarised as follows (see Appendix II for a more detailed presentation). 
Socio-economic systems share a great potential to adapt to climate change. Figure 15 shows the 
difference between the direct cost of climate change impacts (all jointly considered) and the final 
impact on regional GDP after sectoral and international adjustments took place. Resource re-
allocation smoothes, in some cases turns them into gains, initial direct costs. Nevertheless, it is 
worth highlighting that in some regions (SASIA, EASIA and CHINA) final costs are very close to  
direct costs and that in China they are higher. This means that some market adjustment 
mechanisms, primarily international capital flows and terms of trade effect, can exacerbate initial 
impacts.  
   
Figure 15. Direct vs final climate change costs as % of regional GDP  












































Interactions among impacts are also relevant (see Figure 16). In general, costs of  impacts together 
are higher than the sum of the cost associated to each single impact. This also provides an important 
justification to performing a joint impact analysis instead of collecting the results provided by a set 
of single impact studies.   
Finally, as clearly shown by Figure 17, climate change impacts at the world level induce costs, even 
when market-driven adaptation is accounted for. Impacts and adaptive capacity are highly 
differentiated though, i.e. a relatively small loss at the world level may hide large regional losses. In 
particular, developing countries remain the most vulnerable to climate change especially because of 
adverse impacts on the agricultural sector and food production. 
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Figure 16. Role of Impact interaction: % difference between GDP costs of all climatic impacts implemented 
jointly and the sum of GDP costs associated to each impact implemented individually 





































Figure 17. Final climate change impact as % of regional 2050 GDP 












































Let us underline that the above results have been computed only for a subset of potential adverse 
effects of climate change (possible consequences of increased intensity and frequency of extreme 
weather events and of biodiversity losses for instance are not included). Irreversibilities or abrupt 
climate and catastrophic changes to which adaptation can be only limited are neglected. Then, the 
model assumes costless adjustments and no frictions. Finally, the world is currently on an emission 
path leading to higher temperature increases than the ones consistent with the A2 scenario. Hence, 
for these four reasons, our analysis is likely to yield a lower bound of climate change costs. It can   33
be considered as optimistic and cautious at the same time. Nonetheless, the main conclusion can be 
phrased as follows.  
Despite its impact smoothing potential, market-driven adaptation cannot be the solution to the 
climate change problem. The distributional and scale implications of climate related economic 
impacts need to be addressed by adequate policy-driven mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Our study of market-driven adaptation enabled us to re-compute the damage functions for the 
different regions modelled in WITCH. We have been able to compute the residual damage after 
market-driven adaptation has displayed its effects and a new equilibrium has been reached in the 
economic systems. Figure 18 reports our new estimates of world and regional climate damage 
functions. These new damage functions can be used to re-compute the benefit-cost ratios of 
different policy-driven adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
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8. Re-examining policy-driven adaptation:  The effects of including market- 
    adjustments 
 
In this last section, previous results obtained with the AD-WITCH model are re-examined by 
accounting for the contribution of market-driven adaptation. To do so, firstly AD-WITCH climate 
damage function has been re-calibrated in order to replicate regionally damage patterns estimated 
by the ICES model. Then, optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies have been recomputed. 
 
The first clear insight is that market driven adaptation has a strong damage smoothing potential at 
the global level (see Figure 19). This result hides some important distributional changes. Market-
driven adaptation re-ranks winners and losers. In particular (see Figure 18 and 20), the main OECD 
countries are likely to gain from climate change, while all NON-OECD countries still loose (even 
though less than with previous estimates of climate damages). It also hides the fact that a positive   34
effect can be the sum of positive and negative impacts. Accordingly the need to adapt can persist 
even in the presence of a net gain from climate change.  
 
The policy implications are relevant. OECD regions have little reasons to devote large amount of 
resources on mitigation and adaptation in their own countries. NON-OECD countries still face 
positive damages, but smaller than in the absence of market-driven adaptation, thus leading to lower 
adaptation spending also in these countries.  
 
Accordingly, optimal mitigation and policy driven adaptation expenditures are smaller (see Figure 
21). In particular, by the end of the century, adaptation expenditure is half of what it would have 
been in the absence of market-driven adaptation. Even though adaptation expenditure reaches 






























































AD-WITCH with MKT DRIVEN ADAPTATION




Figure 20. OECD and NON OECD climate change damage  
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AD-WITCH with POLICY DRIVEN ADAPTATION




As a consequence, benefit-cost ratios are slightly lower than in the absence of market-driven 
adaptation, both regionally and globally. The upper part of Table 18 shows global and regional 
benefit-cost ratios of adaptation, in comparison with those obtained without accounting for market-
driven adaptation (lower part). The largest difference can be seen in OECD regions, where 
aggregate regional damages have turned positive (overall they have a benefit, see Figure 20). Only 
few OECD regions still face negative damages, and therefore find it optimal to spend resources on 
adaptation. Benefit-cost ratios are lower also in developing regions (NON-OECD), reflecting the 
fact that market-driven adaptation can reduce overall climate change impacts.  
 
 
Table 18: Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of policy driven adaptation  
in the presence of market driven adaptation  
 
   with Market-driven adaptation 
USD 2005 Biillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  WORLD OECD  NON  OECD 
Benefits  5282 202  5079 
Costs  3123 164  2959 
BCR  1.69 1.24  1.72 
  w/o Market-driven adaptation 
USD 2005 Biillion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  WORLD OECD  NON  OECD 
Benefits  14 2250  11535 
Costs  8 1550  6434 




9. Specific adaptation strategies: insights from the existing literature 
Two are the main policy implications that emerge from the analysis carried out in the previous 
sections of this report. First of all, the optimal response to climate change entails both mitigation 
and adaptation measures. Second, the adaptation mix consists of different strategies and such mix is 
region specific. In OECD countries most resources are devoted to anticipatory adaptation, whereas 
NON-OECD countries spend more in reactive adaptation.    36
As for specific adaptation measures, priority should be given to those measures offering no regret 
opportunities, i.e. benefits higher than the costs irrespectively of the adaptation (damage reducing) 
potential.  Some of these measures are already well identified, e.g. better insulation of old buildings, 
improved insulation standards for new building, and more efficient air conditioning systems 
(McKinsey, 2009). 
  
These measures offer three advantages: they improve adaptation to warmer climates of urban areas, 
they create important energy savings opportunities which on their own can motivate their adoption, 
they finally entail carbon emission reductions. Indeed, they are primarily considered mitigation 
strategies. It would thus be wise to use scarce resources to foster the adoption of these measures 
first. 
 
The composition of the optimal adaptation mix is related essentially to the regional and sectoral 
vulnerability, as different types of climate change impacts call for specific interventions. Moreover, 
whereas some adjustments can take place “autonomously” through markets, other responses require 
interventions by policy makers. 
 
In developed countries, the higher share of climate change damages seems to be related to extreme 
and catastrophic events. Damages from sea level rise as well pose a risk on high income countries. 
Accordingly, resources can be conveniently used to improve the extreme-climate resilience of 
infrastructures - from settlements to transportation routes - but also to mainstream climate change 
adaptation into long-term spatial/landscape planning to reduce from scratch the probability of 
experiencing extreme losses from hydro geological risk respect to which, by definition, adaptation 
can only be partial. A net of accurate and efficient early warning systems seems to provide a 
particularly high benefit cost ratio. These forms of adaptation can be classified as anticipatory, as 
they are to be put in place before the occurrence of the damage. 
 
The World Bank (2006) quantifies the costs of adapting vulnerable infrastructures to the impacts of 
climate change as a 5% - 20% increase in investments in 2030, which is reported to amounting at 10 
- 100 billions of 2000 US$. According to the Association of British Insurers, in the UK, accounting 
for climate change in flood management policies, and including developments in floodplains and 
increasing investments in flood defences, could limit the rising costs of flood damage to a possible 
four-fold increase (to $9.7 billions) rather than 10 – 20 fold by the 2080s. If all properties in south 
Florida met the stronger building code requirements of some counties, property damages from 
another Hurricane Andrew (taking the same track in 2002 as it did in 1992) would drop by nearly 
45% (ABI, 2005). 
These adaptation responses include better flood protection, stronger land-use planning, and 
catchment-wide flood storage schemes. A specific study on costs of flooding for the new 
developments in East London showed that pro-active steps to prepare for climate change could 
reduce annual flooding costs by 80 –90%, saving almost $1 billion.  
 
The major forms of adaptation to sea level rise are protect, accommodate or retreat. Nichols et al. 
noted that the benefits of adaptation to sea level rise far outweigh the costs, though it is to not clear 
up to which sea level rise human being can adapt. Total costs including investment costs (beach 
nourishment and sea dykes) and losses (inundation and flooding) are estimated to be USD 21 – 22 
billion in 2030 (UNFCCC, 2007). Building sea dike coast is the most expensive option (8 USD 
billion).  However, costs in isolation are not very informative and what is to be considered is the 
benefit cost ratio.  
  
According to Nicholls and Klein (2003), the costs of coastal protection are justified in most 
European countries. The avoided damage without protection, at least in the case of the Netherlands,   37
Germany and Poland, would amount to the 69% 30% and 24% of GDP respectively. These benefits 
largely offset the costs even in the case of highest protection costs. Although average estimates 
report costs below 1% GDP (IPCC, 2001; Bosello et al. 2006), Nicholls and Klein (2003) found 
much higher costs, about 14% of GDP, which still remain low relative to the potential benefits. 
Smith and Lazo (2001) report benefit-cost ratios
16 for the protection of the entire coastlines of 
Poland and Uruguay, the Estonian cities of Tallin and Pärnu, and the Zhujian Delta in China. They 
are in the range of 2.6 to around 20 for a sea level rise of 0.3 – 1 m. 
 
In developing countries, in addition to catastrophic events, high losses and thus adaptation needs are 
associated to adverse impacts on agricultural activity and, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, on 
health. Assessing cost benefits of health care policies is always difficult, but these are associated to 
relatively low cost-benefit ratios as well. 
 
Many studies describe the possible adaptation strategies that can be implemented by health sectors 
in developed and developing countries (see e.g. WHO, 2005; WHO, 2006). Nevertheless, very few 
researches try a quantitative cost assessment of these measures. The problem here is twofold: firstly, 
there is a general lack of information concerning the potential costs of some interventions. 
Secondly, it is very difficult conceptually and practically to disentangle the costs of adaptation to 
changes in health status induced by climate change from those related to change in health status per 
se.  
Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) reports just one study (see Ebi, 2008), providing direct adaptation 
costs for the treatment of additional number of cases of diarrhoeal diseases, malnutrition and 
malaria related to climate change. The additional cost for the world as a whole ranges between 4 
and 12.6 billion $ by 2030. In the year 2000, the additional mortality attributable to climate change 
was estimated to be 154,000 deaths (0.3%), with a burden of 5.5 million (0.4%) DALYs
17. 
According WHO, in developing countries the most sensitive diseases to climate change are 
malnutrition, diarrhoeal disease and malaria.  Assuming GHG stabilization at 750 ppm CO2 by 
2200, Ebi (2008) estimates an increase in incidence of diarrhoeal disease, malnutrition and malaria 
due climate change in 2030, respectively of 3%, 10% and 5%. Almost all the malnutrition and 
malaria cases would be in developing countries, with 1-5% of the diarrhoeal disease affecting 
developed countries (UNFCC, 2007). 
 
According to the analysis brought about by Ebi (2008), the adaptation response corresponds to an 
increase of both preventive (anticipatory adaptation) and therapy costs (reactive adaptation). In the 
750 ppm scenario, the projected climate change driven expenditure in 2030 would be 2-7 billion $ 
for diarrhoeal disease, 81-108 million $ for malnutrition and 2-5.5 billion $ for malaria.  
 
Tables 19-21 rank alternative adaptation strategies in the health sector according to the cost 
effectiveness criterion. It is worth noting that several strategies are considered even though are not 
strictly referred to the health sector. This is because, despite their lower cost-effectiveness, they 
may have advantages also in the health sector. For example, in the case of diarrhoeal disease, within 
the improvement of water and sanitation facilities there exist interventions like the installation of 
hand pumps, corresponding to US$ 94 per DALY averted, and the provision and promotion of basic 
sanitation facilities, corresponding to US$ 270 per DALY averted, that are cost-effective (WB, 
                                                 
16 They represent the ratio between the monetized avoided damage and the cost of the intervention.  
17 The WHO define DALY (Disability-Adjusted Life Year) as: “a measure of overall disease burden. One DALY can be thought of as one lost year 
of "healthy" life. DALYs for a disease or health condition are calculated as the sum of the Years of Life Lost (YLL) due to premature mortality in the 
population and the Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for incident cases of the health condition. The YLL basically correspond to the number of 
deaths multiplied by the standard life expectancy at the age at which death occurs. To estimate YLD for a particular cause in a particular time period, 
the number of incident cases in that period is multiplied by the average duration of the disease and a weight factor that reflects the severity of the 
disease on a scale from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (dead). (http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/index.html).   38
2006). Therefore, these may be considered “no regret” options, increasing development and health 
benefits at the society level also in the absence of climate change.  
 
Table 19: Most cost/effective strategies against diarrhoeal disease 
 
Strategies  Cost/effectiveness(US$ for DALY averted) 
Breastfeeding promotion  527-2,001 
Measles immunization  257-4,565 
Oral Rehydratation Therapy  132- 2,570 





Table 20: Most cost/effective strategies against malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Strategies  Cost/effectiveness($ for DALY averted)
Preventive treatment in pregnancy with newer drugs 2-11 
Insecticide-treated bed nets  5-17 
Residual household spraying  9-24 





Table 21: Most cost/effective strategies against malnutrition 
 
Strategies  Cost/effectiveness($ for DALY averted) 
Breastfeeding support programs  3-11 
Growth monitoring and counseling  8-11 
Capsule distribution  6-12 





Agriculture is another sector particularly vulnerable in developing countries. In the literature on 
adaptation, what is almost missing is the quantification of the costs of adaptation in agriculture 
(EEA, 2007; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). This is mostly due to the fact that a large part of 
agricultural adaptation practices are implemented at the farm level and are decided “autonomously” 
by the farmers without the direct intervention of public agencies suggesting long term planning or 
investment activities.  
Typical examples of these practices are seasonal adjustments in the crop mix or timing, which in the 
literature are assumed to entail very low if not zero costs. Probably, the most significant cost 
component of climate change adaptation in agriculture is related to the improvement of irrigation, 
or water conservation systems. According to the OECD ENV-Linkage model, which simulates 
projections of the IEA WEO scenario, the additional expenditure on adaptation to adverse impacts 
of climate change will be about 7 billions $ in 2030; the highest share (about 5.8 billion $) is 
estimated to be needed to purchase new capital, for example to improve irrigation system and adopt 
more efficient agricultural practices (UNFCCC, 2007). As regarding the effectiveness of adaptation, 
Kirshen et al. (2006) reported broad ranges, depending on the type of measure adopted. Callaway et 
al. (2006), analyzing management adaptation costs for the Berg River in South Africa, has   39
emphasized the role of water management system efficiency, which can increase the benefits of 
improved water storage capacity by 40%.  
A case study on the Mexican agriculture suggests high benefit-cost ratios for proactive adaptation 
measures in the agricultural sector (Adams et al., 2000). This study assessed the effectiveness of 
establishing accurate early warning systems, capable of detecting enough in advance climate 
disturbances. Adams et al. (2000) found that the benefits of an ENSO early warning system for 
Mexico is approximately US$ 10 million annually, measured in terms of the saved cost for the 
agricultural sector that can plan in advance crop timing and mix. The table below summarizes the 
present value of benefits and costs under different assumptions of information accuracy. Benefits, 
under different assumption of information accuracy far outweighs the costs, leading to an internal 
rate of return of at least 30%. Benefit-cost ratios are even higher for better level of accuracy. 
 
 Source: Adams et al. (2000) 
 
The NAPA (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) Project Database contains a list of ranked 
priority adaptation activities and projects in 39 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Projects on 
agriculture and food security have the highest priority for one third of LDCs. The main adaptation 
activities in this sector are the introduction of drought-prone tolerant or rainfall resilient crops.  
 
Another important area of intervention is Research and Development both in agriculture and health. 
Innovation is needed to develop “climate-ready” crops (heat-tolerant, drought-escaping, water proof 
crops) and to advance tropical medicine. This type of adaptation strategy requires some kind of 
North-South cooperation, because those who need these interventions lack the financial and 
technical resources to implement them. UNFCCC (2007) reported an additional expenditure on 
agriculture related R&D of about 3 USD billion out of the 14 billion required to cope with climate 
change in agriculture in 2030. The case of innovation exemplifies how market-driven adaptation 
can accommodate damages only partly, and how policy-driven adaptation is needed to complement 
other forms of adjustments.  
 
 
10. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Currently debated mitigation targets, such as keeping global warming below 2°C as recently 
endorsed during the L’Aquila G8 summit, are particularly ambitious and require aggressive and 
immediate mitigation actions in both developed and developing regions. Given the reluctance of 
some large emitters to subscribe binding commitments, the world will likely be facing a 
temperature increase above the proposed 2°C ceiling. Even in the case in which the 2°C target is 
met, a series of negative consequences for social and economic systems are likely to be observed 
both in the near and in the far future.    40
Therefore, it is important to analyse how to deal with the damages induced by climate change. Is 
market-driven adaptation sufficient to control climate-related damages? Is it worth investing in 
short-term ambitious mitigation policies? Or should we postpone action by focussing more on 
policy-driven adaptation? Is there an optimal level of adaptation and mitigation? Will the focus on 
adaptation crowd out investments in mitigation? 
This study addresses these issues using an integrated analytical framework. Let us summarise in this 
final section the main conclusions. First, markets cannot deal with all climate damages. Even 
under the optimist assumptions of this report, market driven adaptation can attenuate the total 
damage form climate change, but not eliminate it. Globally, direct impacts of climate change in 
2050 amount to a loss of about 1.55% of the Gross World Product. Market-driven adaptation 
reduces this loss to 1.1% of GWP. In addition, important distributional impacts remains. Therefore, 
policy intervention, in the form of either mitigation or adaptation or both, is necessary. 
Second, under a social optimum perspective (global cooperation to internalize the social cost of 
climate change), the optimal strategy to deal with climate change entails the adoption of both 
adaptation and mitigation measures. Mitigation is always needed to avoid irreversible and 
potentially unmanageable consequences, whereas adaptation is necessary to address unavoidable 
climate change damages. The optimal mix of strategies has been shown to be welfare improving. At 
the global level, their joint implementation increases the benefit cost ratio of each of them.  
Third, there is nonetheless a trade-off between mitigation and adaptation. The use of mitigation 
(adaptation) decreases the need, i.e. the marginal benefit, to adapt (mitigate). In addition resources 
are scarce. Hence, if some are used for mitigation (adaptation), less are available for adaptation 
(mitigation). Nonetheless, in the optimal policy mix, the possibility to abate never eliminates the 
need to adapt and vice versa. 
Fourth, in terms of timing, mitigation needs to be carried out earlier, because of its delayed effects 
driven by environmental inertia, while adaptation can be postponed until damages are effectively 
higher. Were damages considerable in earlier period, also adaptation would be carried out earlier. 
Fifth, both higher damages and lower discount rates foster mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
However, in the first case, adaptation expenditures increase more than mitigation ones, while in the 
second case mitigation becomes relatively more important. The intuition goes as follows. If present 
and future damages increase uniformly, adaptation, which deals effectively with both, is to be 
preferred. If future damages increase relatively more (because of a lower discounting), mitigation, 
which is more effective on the distant future, is to be preferred.  
Sixth, OECD countries should invest heavily in anticipatory adaptation measures. This depends on 
their damage structure. Planned anticipatory adaptation is particularly suited to cope with sea-level 
rise, but also with hydro geological risks induced by more frequent and intense extreme events, 
which are a major source of negative impacts in the developed economies. Thus, in OECD 
countries it would be more convenient to act ex ante rather than ex post. 
 
In NON OECD countries, climate change adaptation needs are presently relatively low, but will rise 
dramatically after the mid-century, as long as climate change damages will increase. In 2050, they 
will amount to 78 USD Billion, in 2065 they will be above 500 USD billion, to peak to more than 2 
USD trillion by the end of the century. NON-OECD countries are unlikely to have the resources to 
meet their adaptation needs, which calls for international aid and cooperation on adaptation. 
 
NON-OECD countries place little effort on adaptation R&D and rely primarily on reactive 
adaptation. This outcome however depends on the particular structure of NON-OECD economic 
systems. Being poor, other forms of adaptation expenditures, more rapidly effective, mainly of the 
reactive type, are to be preferred. This suggests that richer countries can help developing countries   41
also by supporting their adaptation R&D (e.g. by technology transfers) and their adaptation 
planning.  
 
As shown by our sensitivity analysis, these results are robust to different model specifications and 
parameterizations. 
 
There is a final important issue to be emphasised. We have shown that both mitigation and 
adaptation belong to the optimal policy mix to deal with climate change, even though with different 
timing (mitigation comes first) and different distribution across world regions (more mitigation in 
developed countries, more adaptation in developing countries). In this optimal policy mix, the 
balance between adaptation and mitigation depends on the discount rate and the level of damages. 
This is clearly shown by Table 22. With low discounting, a larger share of damage reduction is 
achieved with mitigation. With high damage, a larger share of damage reduction is achieved with 
adaptation.  
 




(Undiscounted cumulative sum 
2010-2100) ADAPTATION  MITIGATION 
LDAM_HDR 44%  77%  23% 
HDAM_LDR 73%  41%  59% 
LDAM_LDR 60%  33%  67% 
HDAM_HDR 62%  85%  15% 
Source: Our elaboration 
 
What are the environmental implications of the optimal policy mix? Given that adaptation partly 
replaces mitigation, thus enabling countries to grow more, but also to emit more, the temperature 
target is higher that 2°C and lies between 2.5 and 3°C (let us recall that we do not include in the 
model catastrophic damages and tipping points). The economic cost of achieving this target is very 
limited, because mitigation exploits low cost options in developed countries and low marginal 
abatement costs in developing countries, whereas adaptation takes place far in the future and 
therefore at low discounted costs. 
 
 
Figure 22. Temperature change in the four scenarios 
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Residual damages are nonetheless low (between 1 and 2% of GWP, see Figure 23), because of the 















































































































Therefore, the optimal strategy seems to be the one in which mitigation is undertaken (and starts 
immediately) to offset most dangerous damages from climate change, i.e. to the level that future 
damages can be dealt with through adaptation. Then, adaptation, if well-prepared in advance, will 
protect our socio-economic systems, from climate change. The mitigation target could be slightly 
larger than 2°C and compensated by a commitment to invest in adaptation. 
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Appendix I : The AD-WITCH model 
 
The WITCH model developed by the climate change group at FEEM (Bosetti et al., 2006; Bosetti et 
al., 2007) is an energy-economy-climate model designed to explicitly deal with the main features of 
climate change. It is a regional model in which the non-cooperative nature of international 
relationships is explicitly accounted for. It is a truly intertemporal optimization model, with a long 
term horizon covering all century until 2100. The regional and intertemporal dimensions of the 
model make it possible to differentiate climate policies across regions and over time. Finally, the 
model includes a wide range of energy technology options, with different assumptions on their 
future development, which is also related to the level of innovation effort undertaken by countries. 
The core structure of the model is described at length in the technical report (Bosetti et al., 2007). 
The focus of this Annex is on the new elements of the latest version used in this report, and in 
particular on the Adaptation module of WITCH. 
 
Overall model structure 
 
WITCH is a dynamic optimal growth general equilibrium model with a detailed (“bottom-up”) 
representation of the energy sector, thus belonging to a new class of hybrid (both “top-down” and 
“bottom-up”) models. It is a global model, divided into 12 macro-regions.  
The world economy is indeed disaggregated into twelve macro regions: USA (United States), 
WEURO (Western Europe), EEURO (Eastern Europe), KOSAU (Korea, South Africa, Australia), 
CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand), TE (Transition Economies), MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa), SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), SASIA (South Asia), CHINA (China and Taiwan), 
EASIA (South East Asia), LACA ( Latin America, Mexico and Caribbean). This grouping has been 
determined by economic, geographic, resource endowment and energy market similarities.  
The model proposes a bottom-up characterisation of the energy sector. Seven different energy-
generating technologies are modelled: coal, oil, gas, wind & solar, nuclear, electricity, and biofuels. 
Their penetration rate is driven also by endogenous country and sector specific innovation. The 
model distinguishes between dedicated R&D investments for enhancing energy efficiency from 
investment aimed at facilitating the competitiveness of innovative low carbon technologies in both 
the electric and non-electric sectors (backstops). R&D processes are subject to stand on shoulders as 
well on neighbours effects. Specifically, international spillovers of knowledge are accounted for to 
mimic the flow of ideas and knowledge across countries. Finally, experience processes via Learning 
by Doing are accounted for in the development of niche technologies such as renewable energy 
(Wind&Solar) and the backstops. Through the optimisation process regions choose the optimal 
dynamic path of different investments, namely in physical capital, in R&D, energy technologies and 
consumption of fossil fuels. 
We updated the model base year to 2005, and use the most recent estimates of population growth. 
The annual estimates and projections produced by the UN Population Division are used for the first 
50 years
18. For the period 2050 to 2100, the updated data is not available, and less recent long term 
projections, also produced by the UN Population Division
19, are adopted instead. The differences in 
                                                 
18 Data are available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_simple_data_extract.asp?strSearch=&srID= 
13660&from=simple. 
19 UN (2004), World Population to 2300, Report No. ST/ESA/SER.A/236, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, New York.   49
the two datasets are smoothed by extrapolating population levels at 5 year periods for 2050-2100, 
using average 2050-2100 growth rates. Similar techniques are used to project population trends 
beyond 2100. 
 
The GDP data for the new base year are from the World Bank Development Indicators 2007, and 
are reported in 2005 US$ . We maintain the use of market exchange rates (MER). World GDP in 
2005 equals to 44.2 Trillions US$. Although GDP dynamics is partly endogenously determined in 
the WITCH model, it is possible to calibrate growth of different countries by adjusting the growth 
rate of total factor productivity, the main engine of macroeconomic growth.  
 
The prices of fossil fuels and exhaustible resources have been revised, following the dynamics of 
market prices between 2002 and 2005. Base year prices have been calibrated following Enerdata, 
IEA WEO2007 and EIA AEO2008.  
 
Climate Module and GHG Emissions 
 
We continue to use the MAGICC 3-box layer climate model
20 as described in Nordhaus and Boyer 
(2000). CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have been updated to 2005 at roughly 385ppm and 
temperature increase above pre-industrial at 0.76°C, in accordance with IPCC 4ar (2007). Other 
parameters governing the climate equations have been adjusted following Nordhaus (2007)
21. We 
have replaced the exogenous non-CO2 radiative forcing in equation with specific representation of 
other GHGs and sulphates. The damage function of climate change on the economic activity is left 
unchanged. 
 
In this version of WITCH we maintain the same initial stoichiometric coefficients as in previous 
versions. However, in order to differentiate the higher emission content of non-conventional oil as 
opposed to conventional ones, we link the carbon emission coefficient for oil to its availability. 
Specifically, the stoichiometric coefficient for oil increases with the cumulative oil consumed so 
that it increases by 25% when 2000 Billions Barrels are reached. An upper bound of 50% is 
assumed. The 2000 figure is calibrated on IEA 2005
22 estimates on conventional oil resource 
availability. The 25% increase is chosen given that estimates
23 range between 14% and 39%. 
 
Non-CO2 GHGs are important contributors to global warming, and might offer economically 
attractive ways of mitigating it
24. Previous versions of WITCH only considers explicitly industrial 
CO2 emissions, while other GHGs, together with aerosols, enter the model in an exogenous and 
aggregated manner, as a single radiative forcing component. 
 
In this version of WITCH, we take a step forward and specify non-CO2 gases, modelling explicitly 
emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF (short lived fluorinated gases, i.e. HFCs with lifetimes under 100 
years) and LLF (long lived fluorinated, i.e. HFC with long lifetime, PFCs, and SF6). We also 
distinguish SO2 aerosols, which have a cooling effect on temperature. 
 
Since most of these gases are determined by agricultural practices, we rely on estimates for 
reference emissions and a top-down approach for mitigation supply curves. For the baseline 
                                                 
20 Wigley, T.M.L. 1994. MAGICC (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change): User's 
Guide and Scientific Reference Manual. National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado. 
21 http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/DICE2007.htm 
22 IEA 2005, Resources to Reserves – Oil & Gas Technologies for the Energy Markets of the Future 
23 Farrell and Brandt, 2005 
24 See the Energy Journal  Special Issue (2006) (EMF-21), and the IPCC 4ar WG III (IPCC, 2007)   50
projections of non-CO2 GHGs, we use EPA regional estimates
25. The regional estimates and 
projections are available until 2020 only: beyond that date, we use growth rates for each gas as 
specified in the IIASA-MESSAGE-B2 scenario
26, that has underlying assumptions similar to the 
WITCH ones. SO2 emissions are taken from MERGE v.5
27 and MESSAGE B2: given the very 
large uncertainty associated with aerosols, they are translated directly into the temperature effect 
(cooling), so that we only report the radiative forcing deriving from GHGs. In any case, sulphates 
are expected to be gradually phased out over the next decades, so that eventually the two radiative 
forcing measure will converge to similar values. 
 
The equations translating non-CO2 emissions into radiative forcing are taken from MERGE v.5. 
The global warming potential (GWP) methodology is employed, and figures for GWP as well as 
base year stock of the various GHGs are taken from IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Working 
Group I. The simplified equation translating CO2 concentrations into radiative forcing has been 
modified from WITCH06 and is now in line with IPCC
28. 
 
We introduce end-of-pipe type of abatement possibilities via marginal abatement curves (MACs) 
for non-CO2 GHG mitigation. We use MAC provided by EPA for the EMF 21 project
29, aggregated 
for the WITCH regions. MAC are available for 11 cost categories ranging from 10 to 200 US$/tC. 
We have ruled out zero or negative cost abatement options. MAC are static projections for 2010 and 
2020, and for many regions they show very low upper values, such that even at maximum 
abatement, emissions would keep growing over time. We thus introduce exogenous technological 
improvements: for the highest cost category only (the 200 US$/tC) we assume a technical progress 
factor that reaches 2 in 2050 and the upper bound of 3 in 2075.  
 
We however set an upper bound to the amount of emissions which can be abated, assuming that no 
more than 90% of each gas emissions can be mitigated. Such a framework enables us to keep non-
CO2 GHG emissions somewhat stable in a stringent mitigation scenario (530e) in the first half of 
the century, and subsequently decline gradually. This path is similar to what is found in the CCSP 
report
30, as well as in MESSAGE stabilisation scenarios. Nonetheless, the very little evidence on 
technology improvements potential in non-CO2 GHG sectors indicates that sensitivity analysis 




WITCH is enhanced by the inclusion of two backstop technologies that necessitate dedicated 
innovation investments to become economically competitive, even in a scenario with a climate 
policy. We follow the most recent characterization in the technology and climate change literature, 
modeling the costs of the backstop technologies with a two-factor learning curve in which their 
price declines both with investments in dedicated R&D and with technology diffusion. This 
improved formulation is meant to overcome the main criticism of the single factor experience 
curves
31 by providing a more structural -R&D investment led- approach to the penetration of new 
technologies, and thus to ultimately better inform policy makers on the innovation needs in the 
energy sector.  
                                                 
25 EPA Report 430-R-06-003, June 2006. the report is available from: 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/mitigation.html.  
26 Available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ggi/GgiDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=regions    
27 http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/m5ccsp.html  
28 http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/222.htm, Table 6.2, first Row 
29 http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/projects/projectemf21.htm  
30 http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/finalreport/default.htm  
31 Nemet, 2006   51
More specifically, we model the investment cost in a backstop technology as being influenced by a 
Learning by Researching process (main driving force before adoption) and by Learning by Doing 
(main driving force after adoption), the so called 2 factor learning curve formulation
32.  
 
We set the initial prices of the backstop technologies at roughly 10 times the 2005 price of 
commercial equivalents (16,000 US$/kW for electric, and 550 US$/bbl for non-electric). The 
cumulative deployment of the technology is initiated at 1000twh and 1000EJ respectively for the 
electric and non-electric, an arbitrarily low value
33. The backstop technologies are assumed to be 
renewable in the sense that the fuel cost component is negligible; for power generation, it is 
assumed to operate at load factors comparable with those of baseload power generation. 
 
Backstops substitute linearly nuclear power in the electric sector, and oil in the non-electric one. We 
assume that once the backstop technologies become competitive thanks to dedicated R&D 
investment and pilot deployments, their uptake will not be immediate and complete, but rather there 
will be a transition/adjustment period. The upper limit on penetration is set equivalent to 5% of the 
total consumption in the previous period by technologies other than the backstop, plus the plus the 




Our goal with the “AD-WITCH” model is firstly to disentangle the different components of climate 
change costs separating adaptation costs from residual damage; secondly, to attribute adaptation 
costs and benefits to different adaptation strategies. In the AD-WITCH model these have been 
clustered in three large categories. 
 
Proactive or anticipatory adaptation, represented by all those actions taken in anticipation to the 
materialization of the expected damage, aiming at reducing its severity once manifested. Typical 
examples of these activities are coastal protection, or infrastructure and settlements climate-proving 
measures. They need some anticipatory planning and (if well designed) are effective along the 
medium, long-term. 
Reactive adaptation, represented by all those actions that need to be undertaken every period in 
response to those climate change damages that cannot be or were not accommodated by anticipatory 
adaptation. They usually need to be constantly adjusted to changes in climatic conditions. Examples 
of these actions are energy expenditures for air conditioning or farmers’ yearly changes in seasonal 
crops’ mix. 
Innovation activity in adaptation or simply “knowledge adaptation”, is represented by all those 
R&D activities making adaptation responses more effective. These are especially important in some 
sectors such as agriculture and health where the discovery of new crops and vaccines are keys to 
reduce vulnerability to climate change. 
The “adaptation basket”, which exhibits decreasing marginal productivity, reduces the negative 
impact from climate change on gross output reducing the climate change damage coefficient in the 
WITCH damage function. It is composed by the different adaptation activities which are modeled 
as a sequence of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nested functions (see Figure AI.1). 
 
 
                                                 
32 Kouvaritakis et al., 2000 
33 Kypreos, 2007.   52












In the first CES nest, total adaptation is a combination of proactive and reactive adaptation.   
Proactive adaptation is modelled as a “stock” variable: some “defensive capital”, accumulates over 
time because of an adaptation-specific investments activity. As defensive capital does not disappear, 
investment is needed to cope with “incremental” climate change damage. Proactive adaptation is 
also subjected to an economic inertia: an initial investment in adaptation takes 5 years to accrue to 
the defensive stock and thus to become effectively damage reducing.  
Services from reactive adaptation are described by a second CES nest compounding reactive 
adaptation expenditures strictu-sensu, and improvements in adaptation knowledge. Expenditure on 
reactive adaptation is modelled as a “flow” variable: each simulation period, some expenditure is 
needed to cope with climate change damages irrespectively on the expenditure in the previous 
period. Accumulation of adaptation knowledge is modelled as a stock accrued by a periodical 
adaptation-specific investment in R&D representing an endogenous progress in reactive adaptation 
technologies
34. 
Then the cost of each of the adaptation activities considered (i.e.: investment in proactive 
adaptation, investment in adaptation knowledge and expenditure in reactive adaptation) are included 
into the national accounting identity. Investment in proactive adaptation, in adaptation knowledge 
and reactive adaptation expenditure are three additional control variables the AD-WITCH regional 
decision makers are endowed with, which compete with alternative uses of regional income in the 
maximization of welfare. These alternative uses are: consumption, investments in physical capital, 




                                                 
34 In fact adaptation R&D could improve also the effectiveness of proactive adaptation. However, we consider mostly 
R&D activities in the health care sector, which in the model is related to the treatment of climate-related diseases and in 
agriculture, which are both reactive.      53
Calibration of AD-WITCH  
As in DICE/RICE the WITCH climate change damage function includes both the cost of adaptation 
and residual damages from climate change. As a consequence, calibrating adaptation in the AD-
WITCH model requires the separation of those two components, which requires implementing an 
adaptation function explicating costs and benefits of the different forms of adaptation. The 
adaptation function is then to be parameterised so as to replicate the damage of the original WITCH 
model. Detailed description of the calibration process is reported in an appendix available upon 
request. Here it is worth mentioning three major points.  
Firstly, we gathered new information on climate-change damages consistent with the existence of 
adaptation costs and tried to calibrate AD-WITCH on these new values and not on the original 
values of the WITCH model.  
Secondly, due to the optimising behaviour of the AD-WITCH model, when a region gains from 
climate change, it is impossible to replicate in that region any adaptive behaviour and positive 
adaptation costs. Accordingly, when our data estimate gains from climate change we rather referred 
to Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) results if they reported costs. If both sources reported gains (as in the 
case of TE and KOSAU) we calibrated a damage with the AD-WITCH model originating 
adaptation costs consistent with the observations.  
Thirdly, the calibrated total climate change costs are reasonably similar with the reference values, 
however correspondence is far from perfect. The main explanation is that consistency need to be 
guaranteed between three interconnected items: adaptation costs total damage and protection levels. 
Adaptation costs and damages move together, thus for instance it is not possible to lower WEURO 
adaptation costs to bring them closer to their reference value (see Table AI.2) without decreasing 
total damage which is already lower than the reference.     
 
Table AI.1: Different adaptation strategies 
   Proactive Adaptation Activities Æ Modeled as “stock” variable 
Coastal Protection Activities 
Settlements, Other Infrastructures (Excluding Water) and Ecosystem Protection Activities 
Water Supply (Agriculture and Other) Protection Activities 
Setting-up of Early Warning Systems 
Reactive adaptation activities Æ Modeled as “flow” variable 
Agricultural Adaptation Practices 
Treatment of Climate-Related Diseases 
Space Heating and Cooling Expenditure 
Innovation in adaptation constituting Æ Modelled as “stock” variable 
Research Activities for the Development of Climate-Resilient Crops 
Research Activities in the Health Sector  
 
Table AI.1 summarizes the different adaptation activities for which data were available; Table AI.2 
reports the costs of each of these strategies as they emerged from the available literature and the   54
values calibrated for the AD-WITCH model; Table AI.3 summarizes estimated and calibrated 
protection levels; Table AI.4 introduces total damages proposed by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), by 
the original WITCH model, those newly estimated by this study and the calibration results by the 
AD-WITCH model.  
 
Table AI.2: Adaptation costs in response to a 2xCO2 conc. in absolute values and as % of  GDP. Extrapolation 







































USA 5.0  2.1  5.0  3.6 31.3 1.1 2.9 2.92  49.0  0.12 0.15
WEURO 7.8  3.3  5.0  5.0 63.3 -0.7 2.4 2.44  83.6  0.21 0.38
EEURO 12.3  5.3  5.0  0.3 2.4 -0.1 0.0 0.03  20.3  0.54 0.17
KOSAU 0.1  0.1  5.0  1.8 3.7 1.9 0.3 0.29  8.1  0.29 0.27
CAJANZ 2.7  1.1  5.0  2.9 23.1 3.0 1.7 1.66  36.1  0.21 0.22
TE 16.9  7.2  5.0  1.7 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.06  28.1  0.40 0.26
MENA 79.1  33.9  5.0  1.2 3.2 2.1 0.1 0.14  119.8  1.48 1.01
SSA 16.1  6.9  5.0  2.7 4.0 0.5 0.0 0.01  30.2  0.78 0.96
SASIA 28.4  12.2  5.0  1.3 12.8 1.1 0.0 0.04  55.9  0.54 0.66
CHINA 12.5  5.4  5.0  1.3 9.7 0.3 0.2 0.16  29.4  0.22 0.08
EASIA 31.2  13.4  5.0  4.3 6.0 4.7 0.0 0.04  59.6  0.84 0.65
LACA 7.2  3.1  5.0  7.7 15.0 5.7 0.1 0.07  38.9  0.19 0.52
 
 
Table AI.3: Effectiveness of adaptation (1=100% damage reduction) against 2xCO2 conc. Extrapolation from 
the literature and calibrated values with the AD-WITCH model 

















USA 0.48  0.80  0.100 0.75 0.40 0.90 0.90  0.25  0.23
WEURO 0.43  0.80  0.100 0.54 0.40 0.80 0.90  0.20  0.26
EEURO 0.43  0.80  0.100 0.63 0.40 0.80 0.60  0.34  0.35
KOSAU 0.27  0.80  0.100 0.62 0.40 0.80 0.81  0.24  0.25
CAJANZ 0.38  0.80  0.100 0.37 0.40 0.90 0.69  0.25  0.25
TE 0.38  0.80  0.100 0.37 0.40 0.80 0.70  0.20  0.16
MENA 0.33  0.40  0.100 0.55 0.40 0.63 0.60  0.38  0.52
SSA 0.23  0.40  0.001 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.20  0.21  0.14
SASIA 0.33  0.40  0.001 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.35  0.19  0.08
CHINA 0.33  0.40  0.100 0.76 0.40 0.70 0.40  0.22  0.14
EASIA 0.33  0.40  0.010 0.25 0.40 0.43 0.40  0.19  0.11
LACA 0.38  0.40  0.001 0.46 0.40 0.70 0.90  0.38  0.31
(*) Reduction in each category of damage is weighted by the % contribution of that damage type to total  damage. Then 
weighted damages are summed. 
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USA 0.45 0.41  0.37 0.44
WEURO 2.84 2.79  2.25 1.58
EEURO 0.70 -0.34  0.82 0.55
KOSAU -0.39 0.12  -0.05 0.82
CAJANZ 0.51 0.12  0.01 0.52
TE -0.66 -0.34  -0.01 0.80
MENA 1.95 1.78  2.41 2.93
SSA 3.90 4.17  4.19 5.09
SASIA 4.93 4.17  4.76 5.51
CHINA 0.23 0.22  0.22 0.50
EASIA 1.81 2.16  1.93 4.17
LACA 2.43 2.16  2.13 2.31
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Appendix II: Estimating market-driven adaptation with the ICES model 
 
Through a meta analysis and extrapolations from the exiting impact literature, the set of direct 
impacts reported in table AII.1 has been computed for the regions of the ICES model. 
 
Table AII.1: climate change impacts (% change 2000 – 2050) 
 
1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C
USA -0.06 -0.18 -0.15 -0.28 -0.02 -0.03 -5.66 -18.89 -6.19 -20.37 -8.18 -25.15
Med_Europe 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 -1.14 -8.33 -4.62 -18.94 -2.00 -11.84
North_Europe 0.06 0.16 -0.35 -0.88 -0.01 -0.03 1.50 -7.74 -5.90 -26.01 50.00 107.82
East_Europe 0.09 0.23 -0.47 -1.17 -0.01 -0.02 -1.13 -10.50 -2.64 -13.57 -4.60 -18.35
FSU 0.11 0.28 -0.41 -1.03 -0.01 -0.03 -6.12 -21.92 -7.47 -24.64 -9.73 -30.10
KOSAU -0.43 -1.14 0.57 1.62 0.04 0.11 -7.78 -17.00 -2.90 -7.41 -3.11 -7.38
CAJANZ 0.09 0.22 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.74 -12.33 -1.87 -14.31 -2.24 -15.17
NAF -0.28 -0.69 2.02 4.41 0.10 0.23 -12.81 -42.14 -10.78 -41.00 -12.62 -45.97
MDE -0.22 -0.34 1.34 1.81 0.10 0.14 -8.40 -32.40 -11.73 -38.52 -13.60 -43.12
SSA -0.31 -0.84 0.47 1.34 0.07 0.19 -9.89 -15.02 -7.17 -7.42 -8.81 -10.59
SASIA -0.11 -0.30 0.28 0.76 0.06 0.17 -2.96 -13.37 -4.89 -17.39 -6.61 -21.43
CHINA 0.14 0.37 0.65 1.80 0.06 0.17 0.93 2.69 0.50 1.79 -1.42 -2.37
EASIA -0.11 -0.32 1.05 2.96 0.06 0.17 2.45 9.82 0.34 5.04 -1.15 1.93
LACA -0.14 -0.39 0.68 1.98 0.07 0.19 -6.69 -68.10 -6.61 -55.65 -8.25 -76.37




- Nss: non statistically significant. 
- In red those impacts potentially negative 
 
 
It is firstly evident that, except for the case of land losses to sea-level rise, they are not all 
necessarily negative. For instance, labour productivity decreases in some regions (at the lower 
latitude) where the decrease in cold-related mortality/morbidity cannot compensate the increase in 
heat related mortality/morbidity, but increases in others (typically at the medium to high latitudes) 
where the opposite happens. The same applies to crops productivity: in hotter regions it decreases 
(note that the loss of the aggregate KOSAU is mainly due to agricultural losses in Australia) 
whereas in the cooler regions it tends to increase as for cereal crops in the Northern Europe. 
Climatic stimuli are indeed regionally differentiated and affect populations or crops with different 
sensitivity. 
Secondly, impacts concern both the supply and the demand side of the economic system. In the first 
case they can be unambiguously defined as positive or negative: a decrease in labour productivity 
1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C 1.2°C 3.2°C
USA -0.026 -0.055 -0.68 -1.76 -0.17 -0.43 -13.67 -35.31 -18.52 -47.84 0.76 1.96
Med_Europe -0.007 -0.015 -1.86 -4.81 -0.40 -1.02 -12.68 -32.76 -15.84 -40.91 0.76 1.96
North_Europe -0.020 -0.041 7.54 19.47 1.78 4.61 -13.75 -35.51 -15.52 -40.09 -2.20 -5.68
East_Europe -0.022 -0.046 -2.46 -6.36 -0.33 -0.86 -12.93 -33.41 -17.39 -44.92 0.76 1.97
FSU -0.007 -0.015 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -13.02 -33.65 -17.39 -44.92 0.75 1.94
KOSAU -0.005 -0.011 -1.31 -3.39 -0.32 -0.82 nss nss -13.03 -33.66 12.31 31.81
CAJANZ -0.004 -0.009 5.54 14.30 1.40 3.61 -5.05 -13.04 -12.63 -32.63 -4.80 -12.40
NAF -0.017 -0.036 -2.52 -6.52 -0.24 -0.63 -8.60 -22.22 -13.25 -34.22 5.95 15.37
MDE -0.004 -0.007 -4.67 -12.06 -0.91 -2.34 -13.12 -33.89 -17.39 -44.92 0.74 1.92
SSA -0.066 -0.139 -4.43 -11.45 -0.37 -0.96 nss nss -6.51 -16.83 16.35 42.23
SASIA -0.204 -0.427 -1.21 -3.12 -0.10 -0.25 nss nss nss nss 20.38 52.65
CHINA -0.045 -0.094 -4.99 -12.89 -0.33 -0.85 nss nss nss nss 20.38 52.65
EASIA -0.316 -0.662 -4.69 -12.10 -0.53 -1.38 nss nss nss nss 20.38 52.66
LACA -0.025 -0.052 -2.68 -6.91 -0.56 -1.45 nss nss nss nss 21.37 55.20
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due to adverse health impact is a sure initial loss for the economic system. In the second case, when 
agents’ preferences change, assigning a positive or negative label to an impact is more difficult. For 
instance, when, due to warmer climates, oil and gas demand for heating purposes decreases, this 
cannot be considered straightforwardly a cost or a gain before redistributional effects are analyzed.     
This said, the larger supply-side impacts in per cent terms concern agricultural markets, whereas 
labour productivity and land losses to sea-level rise are much smaller. Among demand shifts, the 
larger relate to household energy consumption: electricity demand for space cooling could increase 
up to 50% in hot regions depending on the climate scenario; it decreases in the cooler regions like 
Northern Europe and in CAJANZ this last dominated by Canada effect. Natural gas and oil demand 
for heating purposes declines everywhere. Highly relevant are also demand changes for market 
services, driven by redistribution of tourism flows, accompanied by income inflows (outflows) in 
those regions where climatic attractiveness increases (decreases). The larger beneficiaries are cooler 
regions, Northern Europe and CAJANZ (this last again dominated by Canada effect) whereas 
China, East Asia and Middle East experience a loss.  
When all these impacts are used as an input to the CGE model, figure 17 is obtained.  
Final effects are dominated by impacts on crops’ productivity and on the tourism industry. It can be 
surprising that sea-level rise and health impacts appear so negligible.  
This depends on two facts: 
(a) The initially low estimates of the impacts themselves. In the case of sea-level rise, only land 
losses are part of the assessment and whereas capital losses or people displacement are not 
considered. In the case of health, both heath and cold related diseases are considered thus 
the increase in the first is partly counterbalanced by the decrease in the second. 
(b) The nature of the analysis. Here what is shown is the reduced (or increased) ability of 
economic systems to produce goods and services because of climate change. This is what 
GDP, typically a flow variable, measures. Thus, say a land loss, is not evaluated in terms of 
loss of property value which can be very high, but in terms of the lower capacity of the 
economic system hit by that land loss to produce (agricultural) goods. Given the possibility 
to substitute at least partially a scarcer input with one more abundant, usually effects on 
GDP are smaller
35. 
Final effects also present Northern Europe, CAJANZ and Mediterranean Europe as winners from 
climate change. In Northern Europe all impacts except sea-level rise bring gains. In CAJANZ huge 
positive impacts on tourism demand can explain its gain. More interesting is to comment the case of 
Mediterranean Europe which benefits from climate change even though, except for a slight gain in 
labour productivity, all impacts are negative. Indeed if measured in terms of direct costs, climate 
change entails a net loss higher than the 3% of GDP (see fig. 15) for the region. However two 
mechanisms turn this into a small gain. Firstly, an improvement in terms of trade. This is driven by 
the decrease in energy prices due to the global contraction of GDP and thus of world energy 
demand, and to the increased agricultural goods prices induced by their reduced supply. This 
benefits particularly a net energy importer and food exporter like Mediterranean Europe. Secondly, 
foreign capital inflows. In the model these are driven by expected rate of return to capital. 
Mediterranean Europe is one region attracting capital as, its rental prices are decreasing, but less 
than in other regions. These resources spur investment and growth. These two second order effects 
are stronger than the direct effect.  
 
It is worth stressing that this kind of analysis cannot be performed with models like RICE (or 
WITCH) which lacks some economic details (the most important is sectoral and international trade) 
                                                 
35 This is for instance why today catastrophic events, entailing huge property losses, translate in no or just very little 
effects on GDP.   58
and where damages are summarised by reduced-form equations. While a these assume a given 
relation between damage and temperature, and the damage usually includes property losses, our 
exercise estimates that relation quantifying the change in the capacity of an economic system hit by 
a joint set of impacts to produce goods and services.  
 
As a final remark: the analysis performed does not include the effect of catastrophic losses, we 
decided to do so due to the uncertainty of those estimates. They are extremely relevant in other 
studies though, e.g. in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) they constitute from the 10% to the 90% of total 
regional damages (see Table 2). This means that slightly different assumptions on catastrophic 
outcomes may change considerably results.    59
 
Appendix III: An alternative formulation of adaptation 
 
Two critical aspects of our exercise relate to the choice to model (tiny) adaptation knowledge as 
efficiency improver of reactive adaptation only, and on the assumption of very low damage until 
2040. The first assumption is driven by data evidence as investment in adaptation knowledge 
basically takes place in agriculture and health sector where reactive adaptation is preponderant, the 
second is an assumption embedded in Nordhaus’ damage function. The main consequences are that 
investment in adaptation knowledge remains very small, that they are performed mainly by 
developed countries and that adaptation (either proactive or reactive) starts only after 2040.  
To test the robustness of our result we propose here a different specification and calibrate the 
damage in order to have some climate change impacts already at the beginning of the century. 
Adaptation strategies are now clustered in four large categories as depicted in figure AIII.1. A first 
decision is whether spend resources on activities (adaptation strategies) or capacity building. Both 
groups contain some further distinction into other sub-investments or activities. Total capacity 
consists of two components: generic capacity which is not necessarily related to adaptation and 
specific capacity, which instead includes capacity specific for adaptation. Adaptation activities 
include reactive and proactive adaptation measures, as in the main specification considered in the 
text.  
 
Figure AIII.1: The adaptation tree in the AD_WITCH model 
 
 
Using this new specification, we have re-computed the optimal adaptation-mitigation mix in the non 
cooperative scenario. All the qualitative results found with the old specification hold: mitigation is 
close to zero; the optimal adaptation mix is composed by reactive, proactive and specific capacity 
(Figure AIII-1). Anticipatory adaptation is undertaken in advance, because of its stock nature, 
whereas reactive adaptation becomes more important when the damage is sufficiently large. In the 
long-run anticipatory adaptation stabilizes whereas reactive adaptation keeps increasing.  
The regional differentiation of the adaptation basket is also robust to the new specification. NON 
OECD spend more on adaptation than OECD regions. In the second half of the century, reactive 
adaptation becomes the main adaptation form in NON OECD, whereas in OECD countries   60
anticipatory measures are always the dominant strategy. Once more, the explanation lies in the 
different climate vulnerability.  
 




























































































































































































































What changes is the path of adaptation. It starts immediately and is smoother. To conclude table 
AIII-1 reports benefit-cost ratio of all adaptation strategies jointly in the non cooperative scenario. 
They show the same ranking of the previous analysis. 
 
Table AIII-1: Benefits and costs of adaptation without mitigation (Non cooperative) 
USD 2005 Billion 
3% Discounting 2010-2105  WORLD OECD  NON  OECD 
Benefits 29444  8641  20802 
Costs 11237  3548  7690 
BCR 2.62  2.44  2.71 
 
 
Therefore, even under a different structural specification the model, i.e. even when testing the 
sensitivity to a different model functional form, our results are largely confirmed and seem to be 
robust to changes in the specification of the adaptation module. 
 